CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeke Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 547th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

After we reach the end of the list of speakers, I shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider how to proceed with agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", as well as a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Italy, Morocco, Ethiopia and Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I fall in with the tradition of civility and courtesy which is a part of the work of the Conference on Disarmament and extend to you, on the occasion of my first statement in plenary, my warm appreciation and that of my delegation for the exemplary way in which you have been presiding over our work during this month of March which is now drawing to an end. You have done so with discretion, balance and efficiency, the ingredients necessary for good diplomacy. Allow me at the same time to thank Ambassador Benhima, who welcomed me to Geneva so cordially, and your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, for the patience and tenacity with which he discharged his functions in the delicate starting-up phase. I would like to assure the future President, Ambassador Kamal of the very committed and convinced co-operation of the Italian delegation. Finally, allow me to express my appreciation for the valuable support being provided by the secretariat, thanks in particular to Ambassador Komatina and Ambassador Berasategui.

None of you, I believe, will be surprised if my first statement is entirely devoted to the negotiations for the total and universal prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Many speakers have already stressed their central role in the present context of our work; and you are all, I think, familiar with Italy's commitment in this area, at the political level - I would say - first of all, here and elsewhere, in constantly repeating opportune et importune, as St. Paul would say, our conviction of the importance and urgency of the problem. We are now entering a phase of the negotiations which we all consider to be the final stage, while divergences remain among us concerning the consideration of the time factor and questions requiring prior solution.

In numerous statements made by eminent colleagues who have long been participating in these negotiations, it has been maintained that we are involved in a way in a race against time. I fully subscribe to this statement. If we are not able to speed up the pace of our deliberations, we will face the risk of a growing dyscrasia between the evolution of the real situation and the ideal point towards which our debates are converging.

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiasco, Italy)

The present situation in fact is one of real discrimination. Theoretically, today we have reached the high point of discrimination. Italy does not possess chemical weapons and does not know how many other countries, aside from the United States and the Soviet Union, have such weapons at present. The convention represents the only means of achieving a progressive reduction of the anomalies until they are eliminated. Hence what is discriminatory, as we see it, is not the convention but rather its absence. For this reason Italy, which rejects this horrible category of weapons at the conceptual and at the political level, also feels the need for the rapid finalization of the convention, as an imperative that stems from its own perception of security: a convention which will free the Earth of all chemical weapons within 10 years after it enters into force; which, through effective surveillance, will prevent any covert production; and which, at the same time, inter alia as a result of appropriate co-operation measures, will make this attractive and acceptable to all.

Today emphasis is rightly placed, in all disarmament sectors, on the increasing importance of measures for building confidence. This has been and is still being discussed a great deal, and not without tangible successes, in the European negotiations. Consequently we wonder whether even in the CW negotiations, aside from the essential question of verification, the individuation of common ground in the area of assistance and technical co-operation might not constitute per se an important element of confidence-building and an additional encouragement to become a party. I have already referred to our perception of the convention as being the only means for reaching a more pacificatory situation. In this respect the question of assistance seems to us to be of special political importance, in the transitional period but also beyond.

Challenge inspections are, in Italy's view, the confidence-building measure par excellence. Intensive efforts have been made to uphold the merits of a purely bilateral, or alternatively a purely multilateral approach, in a debate which seems to be heading towards more balanced consideration of this dilemma, in which the two aspects are merged one into the other in a relationship of complementarity. Indeed, the very originality of this treaty lies in a balanced combination of bilateral and multilateral elements. Thus while the starting-point of challenge verification falls essentially, within the bilateral sphere, subsequent intervention by the multilateral organization implies inevitably, as my delegation sees it, that the final evaluation of the possible existence of a violation, as well as any decisions resulting from that evaluation, would fall to the body whose task will be to ensure that the convention is observed.

I would now like to express a few ideas concerning the problem of universality. This is a question which goes beyond a confidence-building measure, of which it is in a way the prerequiste. I do not think anyone would deny that the convention must be universally accepted if we hope that at the end of the transitional period chemical weapons will truly be eliminated from the Earth. Differences remain, however, concerning the most effective means of reaching that point. In this respect we deem it important not to forget the diversity of perceptions of security which exist in different countries, which sometimes face specific difficult situations. Thus in the present phase

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of major change and movement on the international scene, the regional dimension may be seen as a more and more independent variable as compared to the bipolar order, where security perceptions at the national level may influence analyses and cause security requirements to be overestimated.

Italy is ready to accede to the convention immediately when the time comes, within the desirable context of co-ordinated accession by a number of countries. Italy is also willing, through the strong relations of co-operation which it maintains with the countries of its own region, to continue exchanges of view on the problem of universality with all the countries sharing its concerns and interests.

In a Europe which is no longer squeezed between walls and curtains, a process is emerging which - as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said in Vienna - could bring about the rediscovery of a civilization where we are ultimately "enemyless". The conclusion of our negotiations on chemical weapons would not only produce the most ambitious result ever achieved within a multilateral disarmament system, but could also become a driving element for subsequent achievements, perhaps within the context of an updated role for the Conference on Disarmament. We have to seize the momentum, as our English-speaking friends say, borrowing from Latin the idea of a period of time which is never complete - and certain events in the last few days are here to remind us of this truth. In the final analysis, these are encouraging signs which must be consolidated. But hope cannot be the monopoly of one continent or of a few countries, however important they may be. This is why we greatly appreciate the efforts which are being made towards the strengthening of all aspects of the future convention, even if it is not always easy for us fully to understand the need, at this stage, to get bogged down in prolonged debates on aspects which are essentially technical or of a drafting nature, or in conceptual disputes which run the risk of turning us away from what is essential. On technical aspects, in particular, we too are convinced that they could usefully be entrusted to a specific mechanism of the type proposed by the Australian delegation on behalf of the Western group: its very raison d'être is to speed up the pace of the negotiations. Likewise, we are in a position to confirm our full agreement on sending certain problems to the Preparatory Commission, or to a phase following the finalization of the convention, in the framework of the decision-making powers of the future organization.

The complexity of the problems of substance which still await solution should certainly not be underestimated; we have them all well in mind. Nevertheless we believe that it is possible to tackle the substance directly, under an overall approach which goes beyond excessive attention to specifics, without invoking an insufficient level of readiness or the need for a prior solution to other related technical aspects. Consequently, we appreciated the initiative taken by the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, designed to encourage a parallel and more general process of reflection, which, by freeing us from the grip of routine and our set roles, will force us to show our full hands.

Lastly, I would like to express Italy's appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the American and Soviet delegations. We are counting on them, and we are awaiting further progress, which could also contribute to the

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accomplishment of our work. The Italian delegation is inspired by the speed and the concrete nature of the bilateral CW negotiations. They benefit from the existence of a political deadline, but also from a different structuring of meetings, similar to that which was adopted in Vienna. We wonder whether we could not try to do the same ourselves, beginning with the chemical weapons negotiations. Shorter sessions would enable us to cope better with the requirements of such complex negotiations. I will simply add that my country would be willing to consider the adoption of a division of work into four annual sessions, within as short a period of time as possible.

I would like to conclude by placing myself, as I did at the beginning of my statement, within the context of the tradition of courtesy which inspires this forum and which has such a pleasant resonance for our spirits. I would like to thank all the colleagues who have extended their welcome and best wishes to me as a newcomer. In turn I extend to them my wishes for serenity and success with respect and warmth.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, as your presidency comes to an end, it is particularly pleasant for me to express to you as an eminent son of Nigeria my delegation's congratulations on the dignity and determination with which you have guided our work. Of course, I cannot resist the temptation of saying to your precedessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, how much we value the qualities he showed during his term of office. Many colleagues have left us, called to other duties, and I send them my wishes for success in their new posts. To their successors I wish a warm welcome among us.

For some months now we have been witnessing a great unfolding of events on the international scene and the birth of profound changes in the arena of the European continent. Whether they prompt hope or uncertainty, they are the result of a relaxation of tension which began some years ago and has gradually spread its effects. Disarmament is one of the sectors benefiting from this new international environment, which should be exploited in our common quest for further progress in the negotiations. While it is obvious that the two super-Powers have special responsibilities, disarmament is still the cause belonging to the whole of mankind, and the Conference, which is the emanation of the international community, cannot abandon its objectives nor renounce its mandate as an organ for multilateral negotiation. None the less its vocation is to encourage initiatives taken elsewhere and to encourage others, particularly in sectors where positive developments have not occurred.

The Conference's resolute involvement in the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons proves that this objective is within our reach. It is encouraging to note the substantial progress made last year on certain fundamental issues relating to the future convention. In this context I would like to pay tribute to the excellent work done by the Ad hoc Committee under the skilful and dynamic chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel. I hope that under the competent guidance of

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee will achieve a breakthrough which will clear the way for further progress. The consensus reached at the Paris Conference, the Canberra declaration and General Assembly resolution 44/115A are all calls to the Conference to step up its work.

The current intensification of the negotiations, particularly in the light of the progress made in the bilateral American-Soviet talks, should allow a substantial reduction in points of divergence - we hope it will - and bring us closer to the finalization of the convention. In this context, my delegation shares the view that the keystone of the future convention should be an adequate system to verify compliance with the obligations arising from the treaty. Only a rigorous verification system can create confidence amongst the States parties. The proliferation of procedures which are at present being studied seems to us to be a positive factor, because it proves that effective verification is within our grasp since it is the expression of unanimity. To this end, we consider it essential to provide the inspection machinery with adequate resources so that it can carry out its mission properly. This machinery will have to have the necessary powers to enable it to make a judgement concerning compliance with the norms of the convention and the inspection reports submitted to it. An atmosphere of trust and co-operation should govern the conduct and implementation of this operation. The team responsible for the inspection should benefit from understanding and assistance on the part of the national authorities of the country being visited.

The scope of the future convention is also an issue of great importance, making it possible to gauge the extent of our commitments and give them appropriate content in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and particularly the Final Document of 1978. Our task is to proceed to the elimination of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, it being understood that the essential goal is the absolute prohibition of their use. On this latter aspect of the scope of the convention, my delegation, like all the members of the Group of 21, regrets the lack of consensus on the inclusion of the question of banning the use of chemical weapons in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. Since these elements represent the very reason why the convention exists, it goes without saying that its legal régime should be developed in such a way as to ensure that these postulates do not suffer from any exceptions. We must certainly set up flexible machinery which could help the parties to reach agreement on the entire text of the convention but that should in no way furnish a means by which the obligations entered into by all the parties could be weakened. It is just as necessary to arrive at unanimously agreed measures intended to deal with any situation which is not in accordance with the fundamental provisions of the treaty.

The realization of the international community's wish to produce a finalized chemical weapons treaty is above all a question of political will. This will is vital to ensure agreement by all concerned, particularly for achieving universality, a fundamental characteristic of this instrument without which our efforts would be in danger of being incomplete. The same political will should govern the search for consensus on the subject of the composition of the bodies responsible for monitoring the application of the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Treaty, particularly the Executive Council. The process of sketching out a number of criteria for the appointment of the future members of this Council should be pursued in the same spirit as last year in order to bring the different positions closer together. The main bodies of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should have the necessary power to do their job properly. These bodies, the product of the will of the international community, should take account of the aspirations of all the parties in a balanced and non-discriminatory way. This is a necessary condition to guarantee technological co-operation among the States parties and free access for all to the purely civilian applications of the chemical industry.

While the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons represents a priority aim for our Conference, other issues are of no less primordial and crucial importance for this body. I have in mind nuclear disarmament, without which anything else that is achieved will remain precarious and subject to doubt. We reiterate the opinion that it is vital for our Conference to tackle the nuclear issues at last in order to justify its existence, which is closely linked with the nuclear threat hanging over the survival of mankind. The unrestrained nuclear arms race which has marked the last two decades has taken on substantial dimensions which are out of all proportion to the alleged requirements for security or deterrence. It was obviously time to start negotiations in the Conference to put an end to this competition. The dialogue under way between the two super-Powers on this subject has fortunately opened up some new prospects. At all events, our Conference cannot stand aside from this process.

The expected results of the future START agreement will, in spite of their scope, remain limited. Even after such an agreement, the arsenals of the two super-Powers will still contain no less than 30,000 nuclear warheads. The result will be continued serious disquiet at the risk of a nuclear holocaust, and for the future of détente in international relations. This is why we will not cease repeating that no nuclear disarmament process, however broad it may be, will be complete as long as it is not based on a nuclear test ban. In this respect we are bound to note that our Conference has been making persistent efforts for more than five years to agree on the terms of the mandate of the ad hoc committee on a total nuclear test ban. In this context we cannot but welcome the actions which the delegation of Japan has been pursuing along these lines for a year now. We are very grateful to Ambassador Donowaki for his willingness to continue the consultations led by his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, in looking for a consensus on the mandate of the committee in question. I would like to assure him of our full support and co-operation. In the view of my delegation, the formulation of the terms of this mandate does not matter very much, as long as the prime goal of the committee is the conclusion of a treaty containing internationally binding legal norms and directed towards a total nuclear test ban. The re-establishment of this committee in the coming weeks will certainly make a positive contribution to the success of the fourth conference of States parties to review the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which is to take place next summer.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes remains one of the dearest wishes of the international community. Our Conference, as an international disarmament negotiating body, has the task of drafting legal rules to safeguard this common heritage of mankind from the arms race. We are bound to note that the Ad hoc Committee set up six years ago for that purpose has not yet met the hopes placed in it. The procedural approach embarked on by the Conference through the setting up of an Ad hoc Committee on this item in 1985 has not achieved its final aim of drawing up an international agreement intended to prevent an arms race in space, in accordance with paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is worth recalling that this document, as well as the numerous relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, urge the adoption of new measures and the commencement of appropriate international negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space. The need, not to say the necessity, for codification and negotiating work of this kind was clearly recognized in the last report of the Ad hoc Committee on space. Its conclusions expressly affirmed that the legal régime applicable to space did not in itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in that environment, which is why it was important to consolidate and strengthen the régime and enhance its effectiveness. If these observations enjoyed unanimous support in the Committee's report, desirable remedies should also have been agreed unanimously, in particular through the strengthening of the mandate of the Committee in question to enable it to negotiate measures to correct the shortcomings found in the legal régime for space. This is why, much as it welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on space, my delegation, like all the members of the group of non-aligned and neutral countries, still regrets the absence of a consensus on giving this Committee a negotiating mandate in accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/112. Voicing this regret, however, cannot prevent us from hoping that under the chairmanship of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, whom we congratulate and wish every success, the Ad hoc Committee will finally complete its mandate to examine and identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in space. We have high hopes that this exercise will be completed so as to start the Ad hoc Committee on a negotiating process as from its next session.

In contrast with what is happening in this double forum, negotiations on regional disarmament are continuing at the bilateral level and agreements such as the INF Treaty have already come into being; others are being concluded, either between the two super-Powers or between the two military alliances. But this dynamic in the negotiations does not seem to have been passed on to our Conference, leaving aside its work on chemical weapons. Given this immobility, and in order to prevent our Conference from seizing up, my delegation would like to associate itself with the call for a process of collective reflection made by many delegations, including those of the United States, Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. We think it is time to look seriously into the question of the effectiveness of the Conference. The former Group of Wise Men accomplished praiseworthy work, which should be put back on the agenda. It is true that the proposals made by the seven wise men do not satisfy all delegations. None the less, if we re-examine them in their true perspective, that of stepping up the negotiations, they will considerably facilitate our task.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Konqit Sinegiorgis, to whom I extend my warmest congratulations as well as, I am sure, those of the Conference on her well-deserved promotion to ambassadorial rank.

Ms. SINEGIORGIS (Ethiopia): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words.

As the month is coming to a close and being among the last speakers, it gives me particular pleasure not only to congratulate you on taking up the presidency but also to acknowledge the able and effective leadership that you have demonstrated during your presidency. We are happy to note, in particular, that as a result of your diligence and diplomatic skill the initiative you took has led to fruitful consultations with a view to informal plenary meetings on items 2 and 3 of our agenda, which without any doubt are of primary concern to all of us. We believe that this is a first step in the right direction, and we hope it will lead to effective multilateral negotiations on the issues in question. I might also add that the early establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 - Prevention of an arms race in outer space - is yet another worthwhile achievement.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, who successfully guided the work of this Conference during the month of February.

Allow me also to welcome most warmly our new colleagues who have recently joined the Conference on Disarmament, namely the distinguished Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Kenya, Japan, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. It is with pleasure that I assure them of my delegation's full co-operation in the successful discharge of our common endeavours.

The decade of the 1980s which has just ended was a decade during which the international community showed particular concern over the spiralling arms race and exerted considerable efforts to achieve concrete disarmament measures. It is to be recalled that two United Nations special sessions devoted to disarmament, and a Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, were held between 1982 and 1988. At the close of the decade two other important conferences that dealt with chemical weapons were convened - the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons.

The last part of the 1980s also witnessed the unfolding panorama of a breakthrough in East-West relations. The disappearance of the dark and heavy cloud that had for so long enveloped the international scene has been enthusiastically welcomed by the international community. I must say that this relaxation of international tension has brought about positive changes that are certainly conducive to meaningful negotiations in the field of multilateral disarmament, thus making the future much brighter than it has ever been.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

It is indeed encouraging that during the last few years steps have been taken by countries both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level in such areas as the reduction of conventional armed forces, the restructuring of military forces and other related confidence-building and security-building measures. More particularly, it is gratifying to note that the two super-Powers, having concluded the INF Treaty in 1987, are currently making progress in their negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arms, and towards the banning of chemical weapons.

While we earnestly welcome such developments as encouraging sources of hope, we are agonized by the very fact that a lot remains to be done. In our view and without minimizing the enormous complexities involved in the conduct of nuclear disarmament, the bilateral arms control and disarmament measures that are being carried out should be not only accelerated but also supplemented by adequate multilateral efforts, if we are determined to free the world from the intimidation of the ever-increasing arms race and the ominous threat of insecurity.

In this regard, my delegation regrets that the first three agenda items of the CD dealing with nuclear issues are not given the attention they deserve. As has been stated time and again, the nuclear arms race and the threat of a nuclear war are issues of concern not only to the nuclear-weapon States but to mankind as a whole. It is indeed unacceptable that all nations whether or not they possess nuclear arsenals are forced to live under the threat of these abhorrent weapons. Therefore, it is imperative that this - the only disarmament negotiating body - should give priority attention to the cluster of nuclear issues so as to start the process of the extremely complicated and arduous task of multilateral negotiation on these issues.

My delegation believes that the time has come to reach a common understanding that all nations have a vested interest in these issues. It must be emphasized that no nation could accept the insinuation that nuclear issues are the concern of only those who possess them. This view was clearly expressed in the declaration of the ninth summit of heads of State and/or Government of the non-aligned countries during their meeting in Belgrade in September 1989. The declaration states inter alia that "general and complete disarmament under effective international control is by its very nature unattainable unless all countries join in its implementation. ... the use of nuclear weapons could lead to the extinction of human life on Earth. Since nuclear war threatens the very right to live, all nations have an equal stake in preventing it. ... the ongoing process of disarmament could be quickened and its coverage widened through the common endeavour of the entire international community".

It would be no exaggeration to say that there is growing frustration among the majority of the members of this body because an honest review of the work of the Conference to date reveals the grim picture that very little progress has been registered on the major issues of our agenda. Indeed, if we take only the very first item on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", despite the high priority attached to it and the prevailing urgent desire by the international community to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date, nuclear tests are still being conducted and the sophistication and

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to be humanity's major preoccupation. The lack of an adequate verification mechanism, which is the usual argument for delaying negotiations on this important issue, cannot of course be considered valid. Notwithstanding this and despite the unceasing efforts and numerous initiatives made so far, the CD has not been able to set up an ad hoc committee, let alone begin substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

In this respect, my delegation highly appreciates the consultations being carried out by His Excellency Ambassador Donowaki of Japan on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the basis of the Vejvoda proposal, without prejudice to our original positions, of course. The progress report by His Excellency Ambassador Donowaki in his statement of 27 March 1990, that all groups have agreed to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863, is indeed encouraging. In particular, we are satisfied by his assessment that "this new development indeed represents a major breakthrough, and confirms the readiness of the Conference to resume substantial work in the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1". We hope that this positive trend will allow us to establish the ad hoc committee on a CTB before the end of our spring session. In our view, the current international situation is favourable for such an undertaking - and we should seize this opportune moment to deal with the issue as expeditiously as possible.

The fourth review conference of the NPT is scheduled to take place in August this year in Geneva. As I stated earlier, even if progress is being made on a bilateral level, we are far from the full implementation of the main provisions of this very important treaty, particularly those relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, safeguards and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances. At this stage my delegation would only like to register its particular concern over the lack of progress in the above-mentioned issues. It will express its position at the forthcoming review conference.

Regarding the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we welcome the important progress made during the previous year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, whose dynamic and effective guidance has contributed substantially in laying a firm foundation for the convention. We are also confident that the Ad hoc Committee will achieve yet further results this year under the competent and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The delegation of Ethiopia is satisfied that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been considerably improved this year by the agreement reached to include final drafting of the convention. This is a clear reflection of the fact that we have actually reached the stage where we are in a position to come up with one effective, global and verifiable CW convention. No doubt there are still some outstanding problems to be dealt with. But seen against the backdrop of the work done so far, we are of the view that by setting a time frame, we can face the challenge of resolving the remaining issues and conclude the convention at an early date. We also share the prevailing general optimism that a convention on chemical weapons is now within sight.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

As His Excellency Ambassador Stülpnagel said in his statement to the CD on 8 March 1990, "there is no reason why we should not set ourselves equally ambitious goals for the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time". We concur with this assertion; and in our view, at present the remaining issues are more of a political than a technical nature and as such, in order to conclude the convention what is most required is a firm political will, which we hope will be adequately manifested.

The need to adapt the CD to the changing positive climate prevailing in today's international relations has been sufficiently dealt with by those members who have addressed the CD before me. In this regard, I wish to pay my delegation's special tribute and sincere appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, who at the outset of our Conference this year drew our attention to the importance and pertinence of reviewing our work in the light of the present reality.

It is to be recalled that Ambassador de Azambuja raised a number of very important questions related to this matter. In my view, an appropriate and timely response to those questions would indeed contribute to the effective functioning of the CD. Indeed, as the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil said, "the time has come for us to proceed to a thorough re-examination not only of some of our goals, but of our ways and means of approaching them". Concerning this matter, my delegation fully supports the proposal regarding the reactivation of the Group of Seven, and we hope that the necessary measures will be taken so that the Group can immediately start its work.

I need not remind this negotiating body that a lot is expected from us by the international community. Our achievements are bound to be measured against those lofty expectations. No doubt, a simple stock-taking of our work would clearly reveal that we have no reason to be proud except for the chemical weapons negotiations which are nearing their final stage. Unfortunately, however, even the progress we are witnessing in the chemical weapons negotiations still falls far short of our expectations due to lack of sufficient political will. In the light of the present conducive international atmosphere, which in the view of the Ethiopian delegation is indeed a unique period in contemporary history, we would be judged severely if this opportune moment were to slip by without meeting the challenges posed by mankind's quest to free the world from the threat of all weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we represent two countries brought together by common actions and objectives. Suffice it to mention the joint efforts undertaken to implement the Declaration of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic. It is in Lagos that the countries bordering the south Atlantic will be holding their second meeting very shortly. This time we will be pleased to have Namibia as a member of our unofficial community of south Atlantic nations.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

Mr. President, as your presidency draws to a close, I believe we are all absolutely grateful to you for your efforts to guide our substantive work. In fact, a large number of subsidiary bodies have been established, and you are attempting to structure the debate on two important and urgent items on our agenda. You are following the diplomatic tradition of another great Nigerian to whom the cause of disarmament owes a great deal - I refer to Ambassador Adenji.

On this occasion I wish to refer to one of the problems which, as we see it is of increasing importance on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament: the prevention of an arms race in outer space. When joining this body a few weeks ago I had an opportunity to convey to the delegations present here a message from President Menem in which he referred expressly to the space issue. There are specific reasons for this, some of whose characteristics it is my intention to deal with in this statement.

It has become customary to acknowledge the undeniable importance for space to the international community. Hence, I shall not dwell on the many different activities, including military activities, that are carried out by States in space. I do believe it important, however, to reiterate that the international situation at the end of this century as far as space is concerned is different from that of the 1960s and 1970s, which saw the most spectacular achievements in the technology race in space and, in parallel, the development of a body of rules to govern the peaceful use of space. Today we see that there are several countries besides those traditionally considered as space Powers that are acquiring the technologies necessary to gain access to space either directly or by placing satellites in orbit, in addition to the now almost universal use and commercialization of information obtained from outer space. Considered from the perspective of our Conference, these factors give a sense of reality and focus to our efforts. These factors do not merely reflect the existence of a series of general principles on the use of outer space for the benefit of the whole of mankind, but arise out of the concrete and tangible presence of an ever-increasing number of States in space. This of course creates possibilities and prospects which are positive, and at the same time raises important questions, especially from a perspective of global strategy and security.

A very superficial analysis shows the observer that in questions concerned with arms limitation in space, notions of exclusivity and partiality still prevail. When we speak of exclusivity, we refer to the fact that there is obvious reluctance to move forward in the elaboration of multilateral rules that would make the space environment safer and more predictable. What is even more serious is that so far as space is concerned we do not even have the apparently encouraging prospects that apply to terrestrial disarmament. In other words, the absence of a consensus on the need to complete and refine the legal régime applicable to space should be viewed together with the fact that at the bilateral level these agreements seem to come up against serious and thus far unresolved divergences. The ABM Treaty on the prohibition of anti-ballistic systems is a case in point that I need not dwell on further, except perhaps to say that this important bilateral instrument is at present resting on extremely precarious foundations. The two largest military Powers,

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

meanwhile, are forging ahead with strategic defence programmes about whose characteristics and definitions little is known. As an almost ironic feature we are even hearing some of these programmes being justified on the grounds of alleged threats from developing countries.

Without wishing to become involved in arguments about the content of such statements, we believe that it would be regrettable to waste the opportunity to make concrete and effective progress in preventing an arms race in space, at a time when the international situation appears particularly propitious. Nevertheless, my delegation believes that there is a need for an open and balanced dialogue on the subject, and is of the view that this is particularly appropriate now in that the voicing of reservations and judgements about potential threats to global security must be viewed together with more important elements, with more direct and negative consequences which have to do with concrete restrictions on international co-operation in the field of aerospace technology - a mistaken approach already tried out some years ago in the area of nuclear technology, and one which today is obviously at variance with the atmosphere of confidence and mutual trust prevailing in international relations.

Turning now to the work of the Ad hoc Committee, I believe we all agree here that the work done thus far by this subsidiary body of the Conference has been useful. Nevertheless, when the importance and the nature of the subjects before it are analysed in detail, this useful work proves extremely limited in scope. Thus far, we have had a constructive discussion on general questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. This has given all of us quite a good idea of what priorities are selected by States when analysing the space issue from a security standpoint. We have examined the legal régime applicable to space, and we have reached the conclusion that on its own it is not sufficient to prevent the possible extension of the arms race to space.

Lastly, we have before us quite a large number of proposals on concrete measures that could be the subject of multilateral negotiations. In the view of our delegation, the way is clear now to take a qualitative step forward in the work of the Committee. The consideration of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was an item on the previous agenda, allowed an exchange of views that was essential for determining the general framework of the debate, when dealing with questions such as the relationship between multilateral and bilateral negotiations in this field, the magnitude and lawfulness of military uses of space, the scope of peaceful uses of space, the characteristics of current space programmes and many other matters. My delegation believes that in the light of the discussions that have taken place on this item of the Committee's traditional programme of work, and without prejudice to our continuing this collective analysis, it is now high time for us to recognize the limits of the exercise. These limits are obvious in so far as, in the continuing absence of a progressive structural framework which would enable us to organize and direct the negotiations systematically, a generic debate on such a vast subject can no doubt be useful, but has now fulfilled its original purpose. Progress in space technology gives this subject its own almost unique dynamic, and makes any generic discussion of these characteristics tend inevitably towards

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

irrelevance, unless they are oriented within the framework of a "rolling text". Otherwise the work of the Conference on Disarmament will not rise above the level of an exchange of views more befitting a deliberative body than one with the characteristics of the CD.

As regards the examination of existing agreements relevant to outer space, another item in the traditional programme of work, my delegation proceeds from the premise recognized by the Ad hoc Committee itself that the existing régime, whatever its intrinsic value, does not per se guarantee the prevention of a military race in outer space. In this area too it is our view that discussions must reflect a qualitative change, moving beyond the repetition of positions well known to all, which, far from helping to find a common area of understanding, deepens the differences of interpretation that always arise in the analysis and exposition of a body of rules in any area of human activities subject to legal norms. As far as my delegation is concerned, to say that the existing legal régime is complete, perfect and sufficient is just as incorrect as to say that in this area we are moving in a total juridical vacuum. Perhaps it would not be superfluous if, before becoming immersed in intricate arguments on the scope of the existing rules, we were to recall that the analysis of the legal régime in the context of the Conference on Disarmament has a very specific framework and meaning, as this body in the final analysis is called upon to negotiate agreements to prevent an arms race from being unleashed in this environment. The Conference on Disarmament is first and foremost an organ with the task of negotiating agreements, not interpreting those that already exist. In other words, any analysis of existing rules must be clearly action-oriented, always bearing in mind that the object of the exercise is to identify gaps and define areas that require the elaboration of additional rules.

As to existing proposals and future initiatives, it is logical that the greatest expectations should be centred on this point. They reflect the thinking that delegations and groups have been devoting to the various ways in which States could seek and find acceptable formulae that would reconcile the activities of each with the common objective of providing a predictable and secure framework for an environment into which man has launched more than 3,500 objects. The Committee, especially in recent sessions, has made progress that we have no hesitation in terming qualitative. The fertile area of confidence-building measures in space is progressively gaining ground in the considerations and proposals coming from many delegations belonging to various groups in the Conference. This is a sure sign of the emergence of a framework of consensus which should be given meaningful content.

In our opinion, we already have sufficient critical mass to permit a more systematic approach to the various proposals that have been submitted to the Committee to date in order to build a framework of confidence and predictability in space. The task will doubtless be complex, but we believe that the time has come to move forward resolutely towards the devising of a régime which, at the risk of appearing simplistic, we could call the Helsinki-Stockholm of space. The major difference, and the major challenge facing us, is that in this instance and in view of the subject and scope of the negotiations, the process will not be confined to the 35 States that carried out this successful East-West negotiating process, but will involve

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

all States members of the Conference and the remaining members of the international community which will certainly join in the efforts. We believe that initiatives such as the elaboration of a code of conduct (rules of the road), the various proposals dealing with immunity and partial protection of satellites, those relating to remote sensing and others, form a nucleus around which a body of consistent initiatives could be built that would help to make space an arena for open co-operation in peaceful uses and transparency and predictability for military uses.

Happily, it seems that any statement made in the plenary of this Conference recently must contain a tribute to the present international climate and its promising potentialities. This gives negotiators an inevitable feeling of satisfaction because of the tangible progress made and the progress which is foreshadowed in the near future. On this occasion my delegation has shunned complacency in order to call the attention of the delegations present here to subject area which is of concern to us all, which is open and which has yet to be spelled out in detail. It is the subject area of space.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend it and in five minutes' time convene an informal meeting of the Conference to report to you on the results of the consultations undertaken on an appropriate organizational framework to deal with agenda items 2 and 3 during this annual session. We shall also consider a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 11.20 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: the 547th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the discussions at the informal meeting just held on an organizational arrangement to deal with agenda items 2 and 3, I wish to put before the Conference for decision the following text:

> "The Conference on Disarmament decides that informal meetings be held during its 1990 session on the substance of agenda items 2, 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', and 3, 'Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters', and that the discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the text that I have read out.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like now to turn to another subject relating to the forthcoming informal meetings. Under the rules of procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have myself taken the initiative of preparing a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3. That list is my own and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the agenda item, as is the normal practice of the Conference. I shall now read out that list of topics:

Firstly, for agenda item 2:

Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I in the light of the trends in international relations

Evaluation of the dynamics of the nuclear arms race in the light of recent international developments

The nuclear arms race in all its qualitative aspects, and related matters

Existing international instruments concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

The interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prerequisites for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament

Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons in view of recent developments and in the light of the global consequences of existing and envisaged disarmament and arms limitation agreements

The role of nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace for 40 years: the need to proceed carefully and gradually in reducing reliance on nuclear deterrence

Principles governing nuclear disarmament

Proposals on stages and measures of nuclear disarmament

Cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and measures against the reuse for weapons purposes of fissionable material released by disarmament steps

Naval nuclear armaments and disarmament

(The President)

Collateral measures with the aim of consolidating and continuing the ongoing process of nuclear disarmament:

Non-proliferation of missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as their technology

Confidence-building measures promoting nuclear disarmament

Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements

Existing proposals.

Secondly, for agenda item 3:

The impossibility of separating the problems of preventing nuclear war and preventing any war

Measures to exclude the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia:

Paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (code of peaceful conduct that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons)

International convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances (text annexed to General Assembly resolution 43/76 E of 7 December 1988)

Prohibition in a legally binding form of the use of nuclear weapons

Measures for confidence-building and crisis prevention:

Measures to enhance confidence and increase openness with regard to military activities, including a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas

Measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to avoid and manage crisis situations, including the establishment of multilateral nuclear alert and crisis control centres

Measures to facilitate the international verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

Criteria and parameters for defensive military postures; military strategies and doctrines; prevention of surprise attacks

New trends in weapons technology and their impact on security and disarmament efforts.

(The President)

I shall now offer the floor to any member wishing to make a statement at present. I have on my list of speakers the distinguished Ambassador of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I wish to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 concerning item 2 on our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". As the statement was originally drafted in English, I shall read it in English.

(continued in English)

The significance which the Group of 21 attaches to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", is well known, and its views are already reflected in documents CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526 and CD/819. In keeping with its consistent position, the Group of 21 presented the draft mandate contained in CD/819/Rev.1 on 27 July 1989. It is a mandate that reflects the two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency that the issue demands and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework of the Conference on Disarmament. The Group of 21 regrets that despite the preliminary work carried out on this subject during previous years, it has still not been found possible to set up an ad hoc committee on this item.

In keeping with the discussions that took place on this item in the previous years, and as reflected in the report of the CD contained in document CD/956, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures, has been amply demonstrated. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are long overdue. It welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral negotiations but reiterates that because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, these can never replace or nullify the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. It believes that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative development directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. It is an accepted fact that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization. It is essential, therefore, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avoid the danger of nuclear war. At the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in September 1989, it was noted that "while the overall international climate is positive, there is still much to be done to halt the arms race". The Belgrade summit also emphasized the extreme urgency of adopting measures for nuclear disarmament through a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

It is clear that global security cannot be based on doctrines of nuclear deterrence. On the contrary, the advent of nuclear weapons obliges us to undertake a re-examination of the basic relationship between armaments and security. The belief that security can be enhanced through possession of

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

nuclear weapons must be challenged because the accumulation of nuclear weaponry constitutes a threat to the very security that it seeks to protect. In the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine is the achievement of collective security through nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, as the first disarmament agreement which eliminates an entire class of nuclear weaponry, is a further vindication of the view that the reduction of nuclear arsenals leads to an enhancement of global security.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the ongoing arms race and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon a willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect participants and innocent bystanders alike. The Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable the view that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, and refraining from action leading to intensification of the nuclear arms race, the nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

The realization that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought is a significant step forward, which must be translated into practical steps. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I indicated guidelines for the CD to provide an effective and complementary process in the multilateral framework. The Group of 21 remains firmly committed to the implementation of this paragraph, and believes that the establishment of an ad hoc committee provides the best means to achieve this objective. The Group stresses that its willingness to accept the format of the informal plenary to discuss this agenda item this year in no way prejudices its principled stand reflected in CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526, CD/819 and CD/819/Rev.1. The Group expects substantial movement on the issue of setting up an ad hoc committee on this agenda item next year, in keeping with the importance of the subject within the global disarmament agenda.

Mr. SHAHBAZ (Pakistan): I have asked for the floor today to make the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 with regard to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". The statement reads as follows.

We in the Group of 21 wish to express our regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. We have shown ourselves ready to exchange views on this subject, here or in the General Assembly. But some delegations have not agreed with this, as their priorities seem to be different.

(Mr. Shahbaz, Pakistan)

I do not need to emphasize the importance that our Group attaches to this item. We believe that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, and that consequently the removal of this threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. While nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. As far back as 1961, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) declared that the use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against mankind and civilization. Keeping this in view the Belgrade Declaration, adopted in September 1989 at the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, emphasized the extreme urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and "stressed the need for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting all use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances".

It is a matter of concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the expansion of nuclear-weapon stockpiles and the introduction of still more lethal warheads into them.

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject. During the 1989 General Assembly session there were three resolutions on this subject, which were adopted with overwhelming majorities. Two of these resolutions, 44/119 B on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and 44/119 E on the prevention of nuclear war, were introduced by members of the Group of 21.

In view of the irreversible consequences of a nuclear war, it is clear that conventional wars cannot, under any circumstances, be equated with nuclear war since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In this context, invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against conventional armed attack is completely unjustifiable. We remain convinced that the shortest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. We have welcomed the declaration by then President Reagan and then General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", as also its reconfirmation in the joint statements issued subsequently. Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

The Group of 21 remains committed to the position expressed in CD/515/Rev.5 dated 27 July 1989, which contains a non-negotiating mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee that will permit thorough

(Mr. Shahbaz, Pakistan)

consideration of all aspects - legal, political, technical, military - of all the proposals before the Conference. We believe that such consideration will not only contribute to better understanding of the subject but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved only through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. We are disappointed, therefore, that despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21, the Conference on Disarmament is not able to discharge its own mandate, which is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. However, the Group of 21 is prepared to start consideration of this item in informal plenary meetings in the hope that the importance of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the mandate proposed by us.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The delegations of the Western Group on whose behalf I speak have constantly stressed the significance of the nuclear items on our agenda. For many years draft mandates as just alluded to, calling for the establishment of ad hoc committees on these agenda items, have not been able to meet consensus. The Western Group continues to believe that the problems of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of prevention of war in general. Narrowing the discussion down only to the problems of nuclear weapons would not do justice to the import of the objectives. What is needed is a comprehensive approach embracing arms control and disarmament and defence. It is important, therefore, to ensure that interrelationships between arms control issues and defence requirements, and between the various arms control areas, are fully considered. It is with this objective that the Western countries continue actively and constructively to approach these items. The Western Group considers that the establishment of subsidiary bodies for items 2 and 3 remains inappropriate. Under current circumstances, informal and plenary meetings constitute the most suitable framework for the continuation of work on the important nuclear questions.

Despite their preference for the consideration of these items in formal plenary sessions, the Western Group is ready - despite rumours to the contrary - as they have been in past years, to play a full part in the informal meetings on items 2 and 3. We accept the informal nature of this debate, which we feel enables us to have a useful debate in this area. Against the background that no consensus could be reached to establish lists of items, or to follow any other listing procedures, we take note of what you have said after the decision just adopted by the Conference on the list of topics which, in your opinion, should be discussed during informal meetings on items 2 and 3. As you pointed out, Mr. President, these lists were read out under your sole responsibility and are binding upon no delegation. We would also like to stress that we do not see in your statement any precedent whatsoever for decisions relating to the activities of this Conference.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): In my capacity as subject co-ordinator for item 2 and on behalf of my colleague, Ambassador Kostov, as subject co-ordinator for item 3, I have asked for the floor to express the views of our Group of countries concerning the decision just now agreed upon.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The Group on whose behalf I am speaking feels satisfied with the decision just taken by the Conference. The holding of informal meetings of the plenary on agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, offers all delegations the opportunity to enter into a specific exchange of views on topics of disarmament which have high priority in order to prepare the ground for negotiations.

We believe that the time is most appropriate to act along these lines. The improved international relations have created favourable circumstances for devising new security concepts and establishing the corresponding security structures. The example of the INF Treaty strikingly shows that nuclear disarmament is feasible. A Soviet-American treaty on the halving of their strategic offensive weapons is expected to be concluded before the end of this year. And last but not least, in Europe a start will be made on conventional disarmament soon.

The international community also expects the Conference on Disarmament to make a distinctive contribution in the fields of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. A first step has been undertaken with today's decision. We hope that in the wake of the forthcoming exchange of views a convergence of positions will be achieved.

Our Group is willing to make a contribution of its own towards this end. In order to enable practical work on these agenda items to get under way, our Group has also decided for the time being not to insist on the establishment of committees on agenda items 2 and 3, which continues to be our preference.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on having guided the consultations of the groups in an able and efficient manner to a successful conclusion. Your unremitting efforts in this endeavour deserve the appreciation and gratitude of my Group.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation would like to point out that, under your able guidance progress has at least been made on items 2 and 3 through constructive consultations, enabling the Conference to adopt a decision today to hold separate informal meetings on these items. This is another step forward in the month of March. I would like to express my appreciation for your untiring efforts in this regard, as well as for the constructive co-operation of the Group of 21. I would like to stress that we have listened with great interest and understanding to the important statements made by the Ambassador of Peru and the delegation of Pakistan on behalf of the Group of 21.

Item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", directly concern important questions which have a bearing on international peace and security. They have naturally aroused the widespread concern of the international community. For this reason they are also two of the most important items on the agenda of this Conference. In recent years SSODs, the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and the General Assembly have all adopted

(Mr. Hou, China)

important documents and resolutions on these items, calling on the CD to submit them to serious consideration and negotiation. Consequently, the Conference on Disarmament should carry out in-depth discussions of these items in a more formal and constructive way. However, for reasons known to all, the CD has so far been unable to perform this task. We cannot but express our regret in this regard.

The Chinese delegation has all along attached great importance to these two items, and has actively participated in discussions. We support the principled position of the Group of 21 on the establishment of ad hoc committees on these items. We have already set out our clear-cut principled stand in a comprehensive and systematic way, and have made a constructive proposal, and we have also put forward a working paper.

On 27 February Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, in his important statement to the plenary of the CD, once again reaffirmed the positive stand of the Chinese Government. He emphasized the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, stressed the priority nature of nuclear disarmament, underlined the special responsibility of the two super-Powers and advocated the right of all countries to take part in the discussion and settlement of these important questions on an equal basis. The Chinese delegation will continue to work with the Group of 21 and other delegations in the above-mentioned spirit, and will make its own contributions to the solution of these important matters.

Mr. President, this will be the final meeting in March under your presidency. In the past month your rich experience and your great diplomatic skill, have left a deep impression on our minds. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my admiration for your active efforts and outstanding contribution and to wish you every success in your future endeavours.

The PRESIDENT: The informal meetings referred to will be devoted alternately to agenda item 2 and agenda item 3. We will hold the first informal meeting on Tuesday 10 April, immediately after the plenary meeting on that date, in order to provide time for delegations to prepare their statements. As a rule, we shall deal with one agenda item per week, either on Tuesdays or Thursdays, on the understanding that, if for any reason we have no time to listen to all speakers listed for a particular day, we shall continue at the end of the following plenary meeting. Members wishing to place their names on the list in advance may do so, but this is not necessary.

I should like now to turn to another subject. I invite you to turn to document CD/WP.383, containing a note by the President on a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. I suggest that we now adopt the relevant decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision that we have just taken, I wish to declare for the record that the statement made by the President at the resumed 534th plenary meeting of the Conference also applies to the request that we have just discussed today.

The secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I have no other business for today, I should now like to make my concluding statement.

Since this is the last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March, I would like as the outgoing President of the Conference to make a few remarks regarding our work. However, before doing so, let me express to all of you my sincere appreciation for the very valuable support which you have so kindly accorded me during my presidency.

You will recall that on the first day of my term of office, my Foreign Minister addressed this august body. He underscored the importance which the Government of Nigeria attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. He then gave an assurance that Nigeria will continue to work actively in this forum and others to initiate and support proposals for the promotion and strengthening of international peace and security. I also on that day pledged to continue to deal with all those matters which were still subject to consultation.

I set as a priority objective the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, at the earliest possible date; and the conduct of intensive consultations on agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". On agenda item 1, I welcomed the untiring efforts of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, and promised to make myself available whenever necessary in order to accomplish the objective of promoting agreement on that subject. I equally drew attention to the need to expedite action on the expansion of the membership of the Conference and its improved and effective functioning.

It is against the background of the foregoing that I now intend to make a few remarks regarding my work as President of the Conference during this month. On 8 March, the Conference successfully re-established the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The Ad hoc Committee, as you are aware, is currently carrying out consultations regarding its programme of work. It is my sincere hope that, given the spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, it will be possible for the Committee to start its work as soon as possible.

(The President)

As earlier indicated, I have conducted consultations on agenda items 2 and 3. I am happy to report to you that following these consultations, agreement has now been reached to hold informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", on the basis of the precedent of the 1987 arrangement for agenda item 2. These informal meetings are in my view the reflection of the beginning of adjustments in the Conference on Disarmament to the new international situation.

I would have been pleased to welcome the re-establishment of the all-important Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". I am sure that all members noted the statement made last Tuesday by Ambassador Donowaki of Japan in connection with the determined efforts that he has undertaken to obtain agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. His efforts will continue and I hope will succeed. At least, he has moved to a new stage in his consultations, that of drafting. This has been a welcome development during the month of March.

Informal consultations on other pending subjects are also worthy of attention. For instance, on the expansion of the membership of the Conference and the improved and effective functioning of the CD, I expect that my successor will continue the ongoing consultations with the hope of reaching consensus on those subjects.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the various group and item co-ordinators for their significant contributions towards finding solutions on a number of problems. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, whose assistance, co-operation and friendship made it a lot easier for me to fulfil my duty. My gratitude also goes to all the staff of the secretariat, as well as the interpreters and translators, whose competence and dedication we all appreciate.

Lastly, I would like to extend to my successor, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, my very best wishes for success in the exercise of his mandate. I am sure that under his competent guidance, the Conference will be able to carry on its work in the most efficient possible manner. I would like to assure him of my delegation's constructive support. As Ambassador Kamal will be away in Islamabad from 1 to 7 April 1990, his able deputy, Mr. Shahbaz, will preside during the interim period. I would also like to assure him of the co-operation of my delegation.

That concludes my statement. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 3 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.548
3 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 3 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shahbaz (Pakistan)

GE.90-60536/1787B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 548th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to two distinguished visitors who will address this plenary meeting. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik, represents a non-member State which, over a number of years, has played an outstanding role in the Conference by contributing in a substantial way in several key areas of our work. His Excellency the Minister is a political personality of wide experience, having been a member of Parliament since 1973 and of its Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs. In addition, he has previously served in the Cabinet.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, His Excellency Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, has been conducting the foreign relations of his country for the last six years. He is a distinguished political figure in Spain, who during an outstanding and intense public career has assumed heavy responsibilities at important stages in the Spanish political process. His presence among us reflects the continuing interest of Spain in all matters relating to peace, international security and disarmament. It is no accident that he is addressing us in this conference room, known as the Francisco de Vitoria room, and surrounded by the works of that eminent Spanish painter, José Sert.

I should also like to welcome cordially, on behalf of the Conference, His Excellency the Director-General for Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament of Argentina, Ambassador Enrique Candiotti, a distinguished career diplomat, who is following the proceedings of this plenary meeting today.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda items 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, and the representatives of Czechoslovakia, India, Iraq and Poland. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik.

Mr. BONDEVIK (Norway): Mr. President, may I be the first to congratulate Pakistan on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the month of April? Norway and Pakistan have enjoyed good relations for many years, and we wish you every success in your important endeavour. Let me also, at the outset, say how pleased I am to be here and to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament for the first time. I would like to reaffirm Norway's strong support for the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its important tasks.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

1989 was a revolutionary year in our part of the world. The process of change is continuing this year as well. The challenges before us are well known. We are now facing the task of building stable new political and security architecture in Europe, not based on political, ideological and military confrontation, but on confidence, co-operation and common interests.

The CSCE process has been and continues to be a vital element in the effort to replace the old divisions in Europe by co-operative patterns and structures of State interaction in a Europe no longer divided. The CSCE spans all the major dimensions of the new political architecture, including the political, military, economic and human dimensions. It is based on a set of fundamental principles and commitments which should also serve as a guide to Europe's future. It constitutes an ongoing process which has served us well in good times and bad.

It is in the light of considerations such as these that Norway has strongly supported the idea of a CSCE summit meeting this year. The summit will provide an opportunity to take stock of the political situation in Europe and stake out the future direction of our continent as well as the role of the CSCE in that process. It could also provide political impetus to ongoing arms control processes, particularly the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament.

In the field of arms control, the prospect of drastic reductions in conventional forces in Europe is now better than ever before. An agreement on conventional forces in Europe along the lines now emerging would improve the security of Europe as a whole as well as the security of each individual country. It would largely eliminate the capability for surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations. It would also consolidate the political changes that have already been achieved and set the stage for further progress. Finally, a first CFE treaty would pave the way for negotiations on United States and Soviet ground-based shorter-range nuclear missiles. For all these reasons, Norway attaches great importance to the completion of a first CFE treaty this year.

But in the context of the broad ongoing drive to strengthen stability and security in Europe, we should not neglect the potential of the Vienna CSBM negotiations. Confidence-building is an indispensable complement to disarmament and can make a vital contribution to the consolidation of the new security structure emerging in Europe. The recent CSBM seminar in Vienna on security concepts and military doctrines represents a pioneering contribution to enhanced transparency in the military sphere. Hopefully, the "open skies" negotiations will also lead to an agreement which will add to the security of all participating States.

We must not permit ourselves to be distracted from the task of achieving early agreement on a CFE treaty. Such agreement will be an important step towards a stable and lasting security order for Europe; however, it will not solve all of the continent's security problems. For this reason Norway believes that there must be no break in the conventional arms control process following a first agreement. In a second negotiating phase we envisage

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

further reductions as well as the inclusion of new equipment categories. The general objective should be to make military structures in all participating States defensive in character, through enhanced transparency and predictability and through a reconsideration of military doctrines.

I have spoken at some length about our European experience, particularly in the light of the CSCE process, and I have done so in the belief that this is also relevant to our global disarmament efforts.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is particularly focused on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We should now be ready to fulfil our commitment from last year's Paris Conference to intensify negotiations with a view to finalizing a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The revised and improved mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons permits the Conference to include the final drafting of the convention in the work of this session. It should now be possible to solve the remaining technical and political issues, and make 1990 a decisive year for the convention.

We fully recognize, however, that important, sensitive and complex issues have yet to be solved. The system of verification of non-production is one such issue. The Conference will have to find verification measures for plants producing dual-purpose chemicals which are not part of the regular routine inspection system. The national trial inspections have provided a great deal of valuable experience and information, which has been useful both for the negotiations and for the national authorities and industries involved in this work.

I am pleased to be able to report to this forum that Norway conducted its first national trial inspection in February of this year. The facility inspected was an organic chemical production plant producing a commercial product by application of a schedule 3 chemical. The inspection showed that it was possible to verify that the schedule 3 chemical was used in legitimate production, and that the flow of the schedule 3 chemical could be easily followed as well as accounted for. A report to the Conference about this inspection and our experience with it is under preparation and will be presented to the Conference before the end of the first part of the 1990 session.

The United States and the Soviet Union have declared that they possess chemical weapons. It is of paramount importance to the negotiations that all countries possessing such weapons make similar declarations and draw up plans for their destruction. All chemical-weapon States should furnish information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. This is not only important as a confidence-building measure, but must also be considered a prerequisite for universal adherence to the convention. Likewise all countries not possessing chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect. Norway has no chemical weapons and we have firmly stated that such weapons will not be stationed on Norwegian territory.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The progress in the bilateral consultations on chemical weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States is, of course, of great significance to progress in the multilateral negotiations. These two countries have a particular responsibility to contribute to a convention that would be accepted by the entire world community.

Norway continues her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The programme is based on field experiments designed for such verification. Another research report will be submitted this summer. In this connection, I would like to express my support for those who advocate that a complete prohibition of use of chemical weapons must be given a proper place in the convention.

Let me now turn to another priority agenda item in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of a nuclear test ban. At last year's session, the Conference did not succeed in reaching agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on this issue. In our view, the draft mandate tabled by Czechoslovakia in 1988 would permit a committee to start substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues. In any case, these issues will have to be dealt with in detail before a test-ban treaty can be concluded. It is our wish that the ongoing efforts to reach agreement on a mandate will be successful.

In our view, the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be given the highest priority by the Conference on Disarmament once the chemical weapons convention has been concluded. This effort should go hand in hand with a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and defence structures.

Norway will continue her active participation in the Group of Scientific Experts towards the establishment of a modern global network for the exchange of seismic data. The global seismological network proposed by this Group will be an essential part of a future verification system. Rapid advances in recent years in computer and data communications technology have opened up new possibilities for improving the effectiveness of such a global network. The main phase of the large-scale experiment on the global exchange of seismic data carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts is scheduled for the autumn of this year, and we are looking forward to the results.

Norway is actively participating in this global data exchange experiment by providing data from her seismic array stations. The two regional arrays in Norway provide for excellent detection of small seismic events over a large portion of the northern hemisphere. A global network capable of providing a valuable analysis of weak seismic events is crucially important if we are to create confidence that a test ban is being complied with. This is the background for the Norwegian proposal that the global seismological network should as far as possible incorporate establishment of this type of array.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The NORSAR organization is prepared to offer technical assistance to seismological institutions that are interested in establishing such arrays. This aspect of international research co-operation represents a serious effort on our part to contribute to the solution of the verification issues relevant to a nuclear test ban. We attach great importance to maintaining NORSAR as a research facility open to scientists from all countries.

The role of regional seismic arrays and their use in nuclear test ban verification was the subject of an international symposium organized in Oslo by NORSAR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February this year. More than 70 experts from 21 countries attended the symposium. The Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmanent, Ambassador Komatina, honoured the symposium with his presence. A report is being prepared and will be presented to the Conference during the second part of this year's session.

Let me now turn to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the most far-reaching international disarmament agreement so far. Norway attaches the greatest importance to this treaty as a means of safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Universal adherence to this treaty would be the best guarantee for the achievement of its primary objectives: prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and pursuance of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The INF Treaty eliminating intermediate nuclear forces on land is a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT commitment of the two most important nuclear Powers. We look forward to the next step in this direction, a START agreement on substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each side.

The fourth review conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty later this year takes place at a time when tangible progress has been achieved in the disarmament process in both a bilateral and a regional context. The prospect of further progress is bright indeed. The scene should now be set for a positive outcome of the review conference, which would underline the continued viability and relevance of the Treaty.

Thus far, 141 States have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. It is my firm conviction that if the two remaining nuclear-weapon States, as well as other States not yet parties, were to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, it would significantly strengthen the non-proliferation régime and ensure the objectives of the Treaty.

In closing, I repeat our hope that Norway, as the endorsed Western candidate for membership, may soon become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, His Excellency Francisco Fernández Ordóñez.

Mr. FERNANDEZ ORDOÑEZ (Spain) (translated from Spanish): I would like first of all to address a word of welcome to His Excellency Mr. Shahbaz, who is chairing our work this morning, and to sincerely wish the delegation of Pakistan, a friendly country, every success at this meeting. I would also like to greet all the distinguished delegates of the other countries on the occasion of this, my first statement in this Conference, and I must also say that I am very happy to be able to speak in this room overlooked by these paintings by José Maria Sert, which clearly illustrate the fact that peace is a collective task, a collective hope.

In this half-century we are experiencing momentous changes, perhaps more intense in nature than at any other time in recent history. The old relationships based on rivalry are being replaced by others based on co-operation. There is a new approach in East-West relations which will necessarily have an effect on North-South relations. The new climate will also have a positive effect in the field of disarmanent. At this point we are in an ideal position to make a change, to exchange the traditional concept of security viewed as confrontation for another idea of security based on co-operation. In our view, this new strategy will have to be built around four interrelated aims. I am going to refer to these four aims, which we consider to be fundamental. First, the steady building-up of a climate of trust. We have often said that while mistrust persists, one country's security patterns will always be based on lack of security for others. The second point is the need to reformulate military doctrines and strategies so that the aim is not to make war but to prevent war. This will mean the elimination of strike capacity and military superiority where it exists. The third point is the establishment in various cases of a balance of forces at lower levels. These new levels must be set so as to correspond to the level of trust, the new trust, and the defensive character of military strategies, and must be accompanied by verification machinery, because without verification there is no security. And the fourth point is the need to channel the benefits of disarmament towards the development and welfare of peoples. Only in a system of co-operative security, security in co-operation, will we be able to make the triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security a reality. To sum up, I think that we are now living through a profound contradiction between political reality and military reality, and that the process of disarmament should cause military reality to march in step with political reality. This means that many objectives that were most ambitious until recently are now minimum objectives, and what we thought were final objectives are now intermediate stages. Lastly, we should not forget that the dimensions of the problem are universal, and that explains the importance of this Conference. The process of disarmament in issues of the scale of chemical weapons or non-proliferation of missiles require global solutions, world-wide solutions, and this also applies to confidence-building measures and conventional disarmanent.

I would now like to say a few words about the process of conventional disarmament in Europe, which nowadays is centred on the negotiations taking place in Vienna. For Spain it is vital that these negotiations should move ahead at least at the same speed as the political changes that are occurring in the continent. We consider that it is necessary to make an enormous effort and work towards the signature of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe before the end of 1990, and that in some areas it is necessary to

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

achieve a share of political compromise. I am referring, for example, to the case of fighter aircraft, where it will be necessary to display the necessary flexibility to seek a solution acceptable to everyone. With regard to these talks I should like to add that no disarmament agreement can be viable unless it is founded and built on a broad basis of trust. Hence we attach the greatest importance to the other talks, the talks which are taking place in Vienna between the 35 countries on confidence-building measures and which offer a guarantee of steady progress in this area. Finally I would like to add that the first conventional disarmament treaty we expect to sign this year is not the final goal but a point of departure, an initial step, and that these negotiations, the new negotiations on conventional disarmament, should go beyond the idea of the two alliances and highlight limitations for each country and each region, beyond the search for balance between alliances, and will require a new mandate that must be negotiated so as to complete it before the CSCE meeting in 1992. Spain considers that these new negotiations should also focus on greater arms reductions, structural changes in armed forces so that their configuration and doctrines are defensive, and limitations of a logistic nature which will reduce the possibility of large-scale offensives and surprise attacks.

Once the treaty on conventional disarmament starts to be applied, negotiations will begin on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is difficult to imagine that in the not too distant future Europe might still contain short-range nuclear missiles, still less nuclear artillery. It is obvious, therefore, that we are moving, as I have said, towards a new pattern of security based on co-operation where political factors - that is human dignity, individual and collective rights, social justice, the right of nations to choose their own political and economic system, and so on - will contribute to the establishment of a new security equation. What I wish to say is that in this context it seems to us that the CSCE has been a fundamental instrument and will be or should be the most appropriate forum for dialogue directed towards creating a new security structure - a pan-European security system that should be created on the basis of the CSCE structure.

While speaking of this new security structure, I would like to mention a topic of particular concern to the delegation of Spain - I am referring to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean basin today contains one of the most substantial concentrations of arms in the world. In addition there are political problems, serious demographic problems, problems of respect for human freedoms, ecological problems, problems of differences in incomes, and there is a need to look at the possibility of establishing a framework for co-operation in the Mediterranean that would cover all the aspects of confidence, transparency, security, economic and technical co-operation and political and social freedoms. Just as we talk about the Helsinki Final Act, and it came about in a similar situation, I think that we could imagine something similar to the CSCE procedure in the Mediterranean and one day we will have a Mediterranean final act to speak about - with satisfaction, I hope.

I would like to speak of the universal dimension of arms control after having made these specific comments. First of all, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Our country acceded to the Treaty because we believe that it has a very important dimension, and we would like to reiterate our position in favour not only of maintaining the non-proliferation régime

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but also of its being strengthened. However, there is also a need for the nuclear States to live up to their commitments relating to the transfer of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which, moreover, are transfers subject to the safeguards régime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In 1991 a conference for the amendment of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty will be held on the initiative of a group of countries which seek to convert this partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We endorse the possibility of a total ban, but we think that the best ally of the disarmament process is a gradual and realistic approach. Consequently, in order to bring about the total banning of nuclear tests, we must start by making the necessary joint efforts to reduce nuclear weapons on our planet gradually until we have eliminated them. We hope that during 1990 it will finally be possible to ratify the two treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

There is a non-proliferation issue which gives cause for concern: the proliferation of ballistic missiles with not only a conventional or chemical capability but also a nuclear capability. Spain is a party to the missile technology control régime and we hope that all countries with a technological capability in this area - not only European countries, but those belonging to any continent - will also join. I think that today, in the light of certain news items we have been reading about in the newspapers in the last few days and of which we have direct knowledge, we have reasons to be very concerned about the possible use of this kind of missile in regional conflicts, so that it is worthwhile to reiterate with the greatest vigour the appeal for the universal adoption of measures in this area of missile proliferation.

On strategic nuclear disarmament we hope that the signing this year of the START agreement, the delinking of the negotiations on defence and space between the United States and the Soviet Union and the START negotiations, will permit very considerable progress. It is our view that in this universal dimension of disarmament of which we are speaking, in the same way that European conventional disarmament has its foundations in the confidence-building measures adopted in Stockholm, the universal disarmament process requires regional or universal confidence-building measures. And if we accept the idea that there should be regional or universal confidence-building measures, we must stress the importance of the voluntary exchange of information on military budgets which takes place annually in the framework of the United Nations, and we think and propose that it would also be useful to exchange information on armed forces structures on a world-wide and voluntary basis, so that their purely defensive character can be evaluated. The universal forum of the United Nations is a suitable one for the negotiation and implementation of these universal confidence-building measures. That is the vocation of this international organization, and we endorse its work.

I have left until the end of my address any mention of the serious problem of chemical weapons. I have pointed out in various international forums, and I wish to reaffirm here, that Spain gives absolute priority to the search for a solution that will make possible the world-wide eradication of these particularly hateful weapons. Spain does not produce such weapons,

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

Spain does not possess such weapons, and we consider it a matter of the greatest urgency to conclude the multilateral convention to ban their production, development, use or storage. Spain is aware of the difficulties involved in verification, but this difficulty should not serve as an excuse to delay a universal agreement. On the contrary, it should be an incentive so that all States make the necessary efforts. This urgency is underscored by the recent use of this kind of weapon in certain conflicts, and I would like to add in talking about verification that the intrusive nature of the verification machinery that will have to be incorporated into the convention should in no way be perceived by the chemical industries or by certain countries as institutionalizing interference in matters of industrial secrecy or interference in the development of chemical industry for peaceful or beneficial purposes. It is simply a question of accepting certain measures that provide the international community as a whole with an assurance that the horrors of chemical warfare have been eradicated. In this context, my Government welcomes the progress made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, although this agreement is not sufficient because of course it is limited exclusively to the bilateral level. Spain believes it is necessary to continue to pursue the policy of non-proliferation of chemical precursors. We favour this complementary policy of non-proliferation, which is another way of achieving the ultimate goal of eliminating this threat. Spain considers that the multilateral convention on chemical weapons is not only a desirable goal but an imperative, and consequently it welcomes the national initiatives presented in this body in the form of declarations of non-possession or non-production, reports on national trial inspections or reports on the future composition and structure of national authorities. In this context I wish to announce the intention of the Spanish Government to make similar contributions in this forum, so as to add our efforts to those already being made in this Conference.

Finally I would like to say that in the present international situation this Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has acquired fundamental importance and responsibility. We fully support - and this is the purpose of my statement this morning - the efforts of this Conference, we have been participating actively for years as observers and we hope to be able to become full members as soon as possible so that we can contribute to its work in a more effective way. In the last few years the process of expansion of the number of full members has been blocked. This has prevented the entry of countries which, like Spain, have on many occasions shown, as they continue to show day by day, their interest in contributing effectively to this process. We consider that in a world like this, which is increasingly interdependent, it would perhaps seem anachronistic to restrict efforts to deal with a problem of such enormous dimensions as that of multilateral disarmament to a limited number of countries. It might be necessary perhaps to rethink the structure and working methods of the Conference, and we could benefit from experience with the chemical weapons convention. I think the international climate would favour progress in this direction. I am convinced that such a step would give a vital boost to the disarmament negotiations and help to ensure universal endorsement of what is adopted in this Conference because, sooner or later, the restricted Conference on Disarmament will have to face the problem caused by having a limited number of members, as happens now.

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

At the beginning of my statement I pointed out that the process of disarmament must make it possible to bring military reality into step with political reality, so that they both move at the same speed. The political reality, the reality that we are living through, has recently been undergoing a radical and very positive transformation. The consequence is that a different international political context is being formed before our eyes, in which disarmament will no longer be a Utopian and endless task, but a reality within our reach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pagac.

Mr. PAGAC (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation congratulate you on conducting the first April plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time may I ask you to convey our best wishes to Ambassador Ahmad Kamal upon his assumption of the presidency during the third month of the 1990 CD session? You can rest assured of my delegation's full support and co-operation.

Since I am addressing the Conference for the first time, I wish to join all the distinguished representatives who have, prior to me, expressed appreciation for the outstanding manner in which Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Azikiwe guided our work in the course of February and March.

The statements we are privileged to listen to at this Conference very often reflect the sweeping changes in the world, and recently in particular in Europe, and again very specifically in its central and eastern part. This provokes vivid discussions and gives rise to new courageous ideas. We can witness the erosion of old biased dogmas and prejudices. Former security concepts and doctrines stemming from them are swiftly becoming anachronistic and are fading away. The urgent need for a common endeavour is being felt in practically all spheres of international life. Favourable tendencies enable us to formulate new initiatives with better prospects of realization, not in distant visions but rather in the foreseeable future. And - especially significant for a country like Czechoslovakia - there is a role for the so-called small and medium-sized States to play.

Profound political changes in my country, as well as new realities in the "old" continent, have produced a somewhat distinct perception of our security needs. Czechoslovakia has put forward a number of suggestions on establishing new all-European security structures conceived in the broadest possible sense, including their economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects. These new structures of co-operation and European integration should gradually replace the functions of the existing alliances. In this respect we consider that it would be desirable to establish a "European security commission", as formally proposed at the Prague meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization held on 17 March 1990. The commission would, in our view, facilitate the historical process towards a united confederative Europe of free nations with equal rights for each one. However, I do not intend to elaborate on the new security concepts of the Czechoslovak foreign

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policy, nor am I going into a detailed explanation of our proposals for future security arrangements. Other international forums and possibly other opportunities in the Conference on Disarmament may be more appropriate.

Turning to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to stress two areas in which my country has traditionally been involved. These priorities for us are the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapons convention. My delegation appreciates all activities which can contribute to the cessation of nuclear weapon testing. We highly esteem the tireless efforts of Ambassador Donowaki to reach consensus on a drafting mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda based upon the Czechoslovak proposal, the "Vejvoda text" (CD/863).

Luckily enough, we are now in a situation where all the technical prerequisites for a comprehensive nuclear test ban have either already been met or can be met in a relatively short span of time. Technology which can be employed for future verification measures has recently improved to such an extent as to become highly reliable. It is therefore encouraging to observe the current results of the Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) organized by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Since it is understood that for full functioning of the eventual future verification system, the participation of as many States as possible is needed, Czechoslovakia hereby expresses its readiness to take part in GSETT-2 in keeping with its technical capabilities.

As for on-site verification, we believe it may be a significant step forward. Nevertheless, that system will always be limited to known test areas; only observers from some States can be present, and perhaps for a limited period of time. On the other hand, GSETT-2 offers the prospect of a system open to every State, a system operating independently 24 hours per day and checking the entire surface of the Earth. Current advances in measuring technology and world-wide data transmission should guarantee its sound operation. In this regard, I would like to say how highly we appreciate the activities of both the Swedish and the Canadian delegations. Czechoslovakia is ready to co-operate with all States in the exchange of technology, data and experience in the course of GSETT-2.

When we resumed our negotiations on the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, we did so under the favourable impact of the Paris and Canberra conferences, and, moreover, in the light of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel the intensity of work was increased, and with the active assistance of technical and legal experts we have achieved important results in elaborating the "rolling" text. We are convinced that under the skilled guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will proceed successfully to the final drafting of the convention.

Czechoslovakia has consistently adhered to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which was signed as long ago as 1925. In this context, Czechoslovakia welcomed the

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conclusion last year of the work of the expert group of the United Nations Secretary-General that prepared technical guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.

In reply to the request made in resolution 44/115 B, Czechoslovakia informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it is ready to provide 2 consultants, 15 qualified experts and 5 laboratories for examination and analyses in the event of an investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. The experts selected are highly qualified in the fields of analytical and organic chemistry, biochemistry, biology, virology and toxicology. They are prepared to take steps to solve the problem of the use of chemical or biological weapons, including assistance. On the instructions of my Government I have asked the secretariat of the Conference to distribute the aforementioned list as a CD document (CD/980), which is now being circulated.

Czechoslovakia believes that the list of experts and laboratories may be of interest to the Conference on Disarmament, since it is ready to involve both these experts and the laboratories in implementing the future convention and in particular in the work of the organs of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Moreover, presentation of these data by a number of countries may result in more contacts between scientists, which will promote an extensive exchange of views, scientific publications or scientists themselves. Consequently, more effective measures not only against chemical weapons but also against highly toxic substances in general, including protection of the environment, could be discussed.

We believe that it may be a useful contribution to our deliberations here in the Conference to release information on chemicals and facilities relevant to the future chemical weapons convention. Therefore, Czechoslovakia will continue to present data on its chemical industry as it did for the first time in document CD/949.

We also welcome new contributions in the area of challenge inspections. Czechoslovakia, like other States, has carried out a national trial inspection and intends to perform a second in the first half of this year.

Somebody said very eloquently that history has accelerated its pace. Current political observers could certainly confirm this hyperbole. But when it comes to security arrangements in this powerful, all-encompassing process, full of unpredictability, one can wonder about its effect on the disarmament talks. Have they adapted themselves to these sweeping changes? Are they responding to new challenges provoked by rapid developments in the contemporary world? In the Vienna talks, maybe. Within the framework of the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations, let us hope. But what assessment should we give to the Conference on Disarmament? There is a widespread and strong feeling that more should be done. Nowadays, the representatives of a number of countries are rightly pointing out this problem. They are questioning the effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This subject may not be resolved at this session. But the important thing is that the discussion has begun.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, it gives us great pleasure to see Pakistan, our immediate neighbour, preside over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I would like to convey my delegation's felicitations on your Presidency and to assure you of our co-operation in the fulfilment of your tasks. I would also like to take this opportunity to compliment your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the extremely competent manner in which they guided us through the first part of our spring session.

I would like to wish every success to our colleagues who have left us since the last time I addressed the Conference and to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. We look forward to working in close co-operation with them in the future.

We have entered the 1990s with a sense of both concern and expectation born of the many hopeful political developments that have taken place in recent years. I think we are all aware that we have reached a turning-point of major consequence. Apart from the significant relaxation in the political climate in recent years, we also have to squarely address the question of the longer-term expectations of mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, which we ourselves have to shape into reality. While the world is not a homogeneous whole, the recognition has to take hold more than it has that all its parts are fatefully bound together. It is our hope that the Conference on Disarmament will increasingly reflect this healthy multilateralism in its endeavours.

Today, there is a perceptible movement away from the precipice of disaster for humankind and a constructive dialogue has been started. For this, we must pay tribute to the sagacity of the American and Soviet leaderships, who have seen the folly of nuclear escalation and have started tracing the outlines of a pattern of disarmament. In our view, the INF Treaty is notable not so much for the few thousand missiles that are to be dismantled as a result of its provisions, but for the historical beginning it made, away from the old approach of seeking to manage an escalating arms race and, we hope, towards halting and reversing it. The INF Treaty was a historical departure in erasing a complete class of weapon systems for the first time. It demonstrated the principle, even if in limited form, that the road to enhanced security lies through nuclear disarmament and not through accumulation of nuclear weaponry. We look forward to the signing of the START agreement between the United States and the USSR later this year in the hope that it will pave the way for all States to join in the process of nuclear disarmament and thus enable the world to move in the not too distant future towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The process and logic of nuclear disarmament in one field should be extended energetically to other fields. For instance, the logic of the INF Treaty and the forthcoming START agreement dictates that the thousands of tactical weapons that still exist - and for that matter all nuclear weapons - must also follow the route of abolition. The positive momentum generated by international events today

(Mr. Sharma, India)

should not be allowed to dissipate, and the historic opportunity of ridding our planet of the apocalyptic menace of nuclear weapons should be seized purposefully.

The validity of nuclear weapons cannot be justified on the basis of doctrines of nuclear deterrence and the claim that nuclear weapons have maintained peace in the post-war years. Nuclear weapons cannot be given credence on the grounds that they stabilize the era of friction, which we wish to put behind us. Rather, the nuclear arms race has exacerbated the friction to a level of lethality which embraces the whole of mankind. It would indeed be an irrational world in which doomsday weapons could be seen or legitimized as a prescription. The rivalry which the nuclear arms race represented had a negative effect on all parts of the globe. Let us not see as any form of remedy a class of weapons which it is now proven would bring complete annihilation and a global radioactive winter in their wake. The world is beginning to see the imperatives of enlightened globalism in the challenge of poverty and development, degradation of the environment, economic and technological interdependence, the need to husband resources for common goals and the inter-connectedness of all the enormous tasks the world faces. It is our hope that this globality of concern will also inform the dialogue for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which should be the priority area in this multilateral negotiating forum. As we know from the prescient warning against the juggernaut of the industrial-military complex delivered four decades ago, a vast constituency composed of industry, the military, scientists, engineers and bureaucrats constitutes a critical and catalytic group of vested interests for the doctrinal underpinning and maintenance of the nuclear arms race. It produces the theorists, developers and deployers of ever more complex and destructive systems and devices. We have to believe that with sustained and enlightened political will and dialogue this ethos can be transformed. The United Nations Charter does give all Member States the right to individual and collective self-defence, but those who drafted these essential safeguards could not have imagined that they could be made to imply the right to threaten the survival of the world, which the Charter was supposed to lead into an enlightened new age.

We firmly believe that the time has come for the international community to engage in collective introspection on our present predicament. Serious consideration needs to be given to the attitudes, policies, doctrines, institutions and instruments required for a nuclear-weapon-free world, which it is in our hands to realize. In particular, the misplaced faith in the relevance of nuclear weapons for keeping peace and enhancing security needs to be speedily discarded. An air of cautious optimism and hope is all that we can allow ourselves at this stage. The recent signs of a turning-point that we have perceived are vulnerable. These cannot be nurtured in a world order based on any form of domination or divisiveness, whether political, economic or military. At SSOD-III, India proposed the outline of a nuclear-weapon-free and peaceful world order in the form of an action plan, which called upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. While nuclear disarmament constitutes the central motif in each stage of the plan, it is supported by collateral and other measures to further the process in a comprehensive manner that would enhance global security. It includes proposals for banning chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,

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bringing to a halt and reversing the arms race, using scientific and technological developments for the benefit of mankind and reducing conventional arms and armed forces to the minimum levels required for defence purposes, and sets out principles for the conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear weapons. The action plan has been tabled in the Conference on Disarmament as CD/859 of 15 August 1988. We believe that the action plan will always be relevant in a world which seeks an alternative structure of inter-State relations.

This is the vision and backdrop against which we look at the activities of the CD, the sole forum of the United Nations for negotiation of disarmament agreements. My delegation attaches the highest priority to the first three nuclear issues on our agenda. Our record on these items has been disappointing. We still find ourselves unable to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. For many years, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions with overwhelming support regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and reaffirming the responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such an agreement. Partial or gradual approaches evade the issue and cannot provide the answer to this universal concern. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated as CD/723 four years ago, the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. The twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just ended. Very soon, phase 3 of GSETT-2, to develop a global system for seismic data exchange, will get under way. It is time an ad hoc committee on this item was established to provide the necessary political framework within which to consider the important results of GSETT-2. Ambassador Yamada of Japan and his successor Ambassador Donowaki have undertaken intensive consultations with all delegations to try and resolve the issue of the mandate for this committee. We are appreciative of their efforts. It is encouraging to note that there is a narrowing of differences. The flexibility shown by a majority of the members of the CD has to be matched by others if an ad hoc committee is to be established during this year. The situation is much the same on items 2 and 3 - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" - where, once again, we have had to resort to discussing these topics, which should be of central concern to the CD, in the form of informal plenary meetings. While we welcome progress achieved in bilateral negotiations, nuclear-weapon States should, in keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. Whatever the differences in the theoretical models used, there is a clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophe for our biosphere. Conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war. It is by now a truism that if nuclear weapons are ever used, it will not matter who used them first. It is, therefore, clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used for any kind of defence. Pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear holocaust is to conclude a convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as the currency of power.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

The malaise of inaction arising out of unshakable positions has also prevented useful work on agenda item 5 - "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Despite the fact that the Ad hoc Committee has once again been set up with a non-negotiating mandate, procedural issues like the programme of work have stalled our work in this very important field, where qualitative research on weapons systems has been undertaken with intensity. Over the past few years, we have debated this issue endlessly. Instead of getting into such a debate again, the Conference on Disarmament should work on specific proposals to prevent outer space from becoming the new frontier of the all too familiar terrestrial arms race. More than a dozen concrete proposals have been put forward by delegations. Priority should be accorded to halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, dismantling existing systems, prohibiting the introduction of new weapon systems in outer space and ensuring that the existing 1972 ABM Treaty is fully honoured and extended as required by new technological advances. The issues of verification are complex enough today. If anti-satellite weapons and other space weapons are deployed, this problem would threaten to become intractable.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Similarly, article XI on economic and technological development should ensure that no arbitrary restrictions or export controls are imposed against another State party once the treaty is in place with its attendant verification system. The significance of the CW convention lies as much in the world community successfully abolishing an abhorrent class of weapons as in the successful example it would create of the universal approach which should characterize other deliberations of the Conference. We still believe, as we suggested earlier, that the Conference on Disarmament should take advantage of the political momentum by setting itself a deadline to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

The fourth NPT review conference is scheduled to be held later this year. Though India has not subscribed to the NPT on account of its discriminatory character and is not a State party to it, it is useful to recall that India, along with seven other countries, sponsored one of the first resolutions on this subject in the General Assembly in 1965. The resolution, which identified a set of principles to guide the negotiations on an eventual treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, was adopted unopposed. One of the principles was that the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit proliferation by nuclear or non-nuclear Powers, and that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Unfortunately, the 1968 NPT failed to reflect either of these principles, and the apprehensions of vertical and spatial proliferation have been amply borne out. Even with the reductions under negotiation in the START talks, there will exist almost double the number of nuclear warheads that existed in 1968. It is relevant to recall that the NPT was not to be an end in itself but was meant to lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is in this spirit that India's action plan called for negotiations for a new treaty that would "give legal effect to the binding commitment of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010, and of all the non-nuclear-weapon States not to cross the nuclear weapons threshold". We hope that the States parties to the NPT will take advantage of the 1990 session to look at the genesis of this Treaty and take decisive steps towards a more broad-based regime as part of a comprehensive system of peace and security.

Finally, I would like to quote the United Nations Secretary-General's end-of-year message of 27 December 1989, which sums up the options before us:

> "Despite the present uncertainties and recent violence, 1989 has been a historic and epoch-making year: this is by now universally recognized. ... There is little doubt that these developments have unfrozen the old fears and animosities which dominated the world for decades. They hold tangible promise of ending the incessant arms race. ... They have thus phenomenally advanced the interests of global peace. ... the new possibilities for international co-operation will remain but shadowy or sectional if they are not brought to bear on the old stubborn problems, unrelated to the cold war. ... The agenda for international action is not, therefore, lightened in the slightest degree. If anything, it now invites the undeflected attention which it has not received so far."

It is our hope that the CD will reflect this prescription in exercising its mandate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Ambassador Al-Ketal.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to say how pleased we are to see you, who represent Pakistan, a Muslim and friendly country, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, because everyone is familiar with your skills.

It is a particular pleasure for us to have yet another opportunity to address this body. The presence of Iraq in the Conference on Disarmament and its participation in the Conference's work in this and the previous year clearly demonstrate the interest that the Government of Iraq has in disarmament negotiations, as well as its support for all international efforts to devise effective methods to control nuclear armament, reducing it to the minimum level needed to protect the integrity and security of States, and totally eliminating all weapons of mass destruction in order to free our world from the threat of annihilation due to the accumulation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The Government of the Republic of Iraq is simultaneously endeavouring to ensure the advent of a world in which relations based on the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law and the settlement of bilateral and regional conflicts through direct negotiations among the parties concerned will prevail. My Government has expressed its belief in these principles by giving a positive response to international peace efforts and by respecting all Security Council resolutions adopted since September 1980 in which the Security Council has called for a cease-fire between Iraq and Iran and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Iraq was the first to accept resolution 598 and informed the Secretary-General of its acceptance only two days after the adoption of the resolution.

For disarmament negotiations to result in effective measures that can win wide support, those measures must be conducive to the national security interests of States. In that regard, Iraq has always endeavoured to achieve a just, comprehensive and durable peace with Iran, and to eliminate the reasons which have compelled the States of this region to enter into an escalating arms race, so that they can redirect their efforts towards national reconstruction.

To ensure the security of States in an adequate fashion, it is not enough to take regional measures. Weapons have developed and can now reach their targets irrespective of national and regional boundaries. Likewise, the use of nuclear weapons would have a devastating effect on other States, even those not directly involved in the conflict. Therefore it would be unwise to focus efforts on security in just one region of the world separately from the security of other regions of the world. The security concerns of the developing countries are justified in so far as they do not benefit from the same degree of attention as those of the developed countries. In order for peace to be established in the world on a clear basis, disarmament measures must be encouraged. A peace based on mutual terror rather than equality and justice cannot endure.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

The presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle Eastern region poses a serious threat to peace and security and is a source of deep concern to the countries of the region. Iraq, together with all other Arab States, has called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region and the prohibition of the proliferation of such weapons in the countries of that region, regardless of whether those weapons belong to those countries and are under their control, or are under the control of a third State outside the region. However, Israel's persistent opposition and refusal to give up its nuclear weapons in a legally binding manner, as well as its refusal to subject its nuclear facilities to international control, as has been done by Iraq and other States of the region which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, constitutes an obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The continuation of the present situation is not conducive to the adoption of effective disarmament measures. On the contrary, it will lead to a further escalation of the arms race in the region.

Since the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, our Conference has continued its discussions on the total prohibition of these weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. During this period, several conferences and symposia have been held on this subject in various regions of the world, including the Canberra Conference held in September 1989. No observer at these conferences would have any difficulty in acknowledging the following facts which have characterized international efforts in this field. Firstly, the Paris Conference greatly furthered international efforts, and the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in particular, to draft an international treaty totally prohibiting the production and utilization of chemical weapons. However, the slow progress of negotiations and the persistence of obstacles and numerous problems that are as yet unresolved have diminished the momentum engendered by the Paris Conference. Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament achieved limited progress in negotiations last year, given the fact that many issues and problems were raised in regard to various aspects of the draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, some countries participating in the negotiations attached more importance to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons than to the elimination of the weapons which they already possess. Some countries have opted for a policy of placing greater constraints on the transfer of various products and technologies to prevent their use in the production of chemical weapons. Such measures not only violate the incontrovertible right of countries to acquire the technology and materials needed for development; they also constitute a violation of the Paris Declaration on chemical weapons, a declaration which was drafted by those countries themselves. Thirdly, since the signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR, the nuclear-weapon States have adopted no practical measure for the control of nuclear weapons, or for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests - despite the appreciable improvements that have occurred in East/West relations and the fundamental changes that have taken place in recent months in Europe.

Our presence in this Conference stems from our desire to participate seriously in all international efforts in the field of disarmament in accordance with the concepts and principles that I outlined at the beginning of my statement. However, we will not agree to become a party to any effort aimed at making negotiations on chemical weapons a pretext to prevent

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developing countries from having access to chemical technology and products or to impede a transfer of technology in this area. Hence, we call upon the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a clearly defined position on the transfer of technology, products and information, and to refuse to allow its efforts to be exploited for the purpose of impeding development in the developing countries.

With regard to the convention on chemical weapons, I have some comments to make. The convention must be drafted in such a way as to make it universally acceptable. The crucial issues in this connection include the legitimate, actual needs of the developing countries, and primarily security guarantees against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. The convention will be widely supported if it contains a binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take nuclear disarmament measures as a corollary to chemical disarmament measures. They should also enter into a commitment not to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and toxic gases. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction at the fact that our efforts have taken a step forward through the agreement to hold a Conference to review the partial test-ban Treaty in order to examine proposed amendments which we hope will convert this treaty eventually into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Our support for these measures does not signify premature optimism at the possibility of such a result, because that will depend on the attitudes adopted by the nuclear-weapon States during the review conference. The attitudes that these States have hitherto instigated do not make us particularly optimistic in this regard. In these negotiations, it would be particularly inadmissible for nuclear armament to remain isolated from the focal point of interest, thereby leaving this question in suspense and ineffective.

(continued in English)

I have now come to the end of my written statement. With your permission, however, Mr. President, I would like to add a few words with regard to a matter that is very much related to the work of the CD.

I am referring to the latest campaign of falsification - smears - against my country carried out in part in the United States and in part in the United Kingdom, echoed by other circles. First, I would like to say that all these accusations have been denied as unfounded and baseless by the Iraqi Government. Second, I will not try to go into the details of these allegations; all missions will receive a circular from the Mission of Iraq containing all pertinent details of the incident. You will find that the first act in this play was staged on American television, this by showing some aerial photographs, claimed without any proof that these were Iraqi installations. The network went on to say that this installation was used for uranium, the other one for so-and-so, without producing any proof. If one has questions about the timing of the programme, unhappily the answer came quickly from Heathrow. That was the second act in the play. What is the third act? We believe that these are actions designed to prepare the way for a new aggression against my country, against our scientific industrial installations, similar to that carried out by Israel in 1981. In this

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connection, I would like to state the following points of principle. First, Iraq is a sovereign State and has the right and duty to acquire the means needed to defend itself and to guarantee its security in accordance with international law. Second, Iraq as a sovereign State has the inalienable right to acquire any technology it deems necessary for its industrial, scientific and social development. Peaceful nuclear energy is no exception. Third, the aim of this campaign against Iraq is to lay the ground for a new aggression against Iraqi industrial and scientific installations, and to frustrate the legitimate ambitions of the Iraqi people for social progress. Fourth, the present campaign of distortions against Iraq, a party to the NPT, will if continued call into question the usefulness of the NPT as an international treaty. It will also have consequences for the coming review conference of the Treaty. Fifth, the NPT contains means and procedures of verification. It entrusts IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the task of verification and inspection. Attempts by a State to take the law into its own hands and to assume the role of policing others' commitments under the Treaty will seriously undermine the role of IAEA and greatly damage its safeguards system. Sixth, disarmament is a matter for negotiation among States with the aim of achieving reduced levels of armaments with undiminished security. Deviations from this norm, which is universally accepted, and attempts to replace it by unilateral actions will deal a blow to disarmament negotiations. Negotiations, by their very definition, are among equals, equals that enjoy the same rights. Campaigns of distortion - smear - cannot in anyone's mind be considered as confidence-building measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Iraq for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate your delegation on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month. I can assure you of my delegation's full support and co-operation in your efforts. I wish to thank your predecessors in the Chair, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for their able guidance in our deliberations. Let me also take this opportunity to welcome all new colleagues who have recently joined us and assure them that my delegation will actively co-operate with them. I would like to ask them to convey to their predecessors our best wishes in their new appointments and in their personal lives.

I listened with great interest to the very important and thought-provoking statements made by their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Norway and Spain.

I would like to limit my intervention today to the issue of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. I was prompted to do so by the inspiring statements of many speakers who have preceded me during this spring session. Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil opened the series at the very beginning of our work. I share his opinion that "the time has come for us to proceed to a thorough re-examination not only of some of our goals, but of our ways and means of approaching them".

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

This is particularly true when we look at the inefficiency and lack of progress on many items of our agenda in the light of the positive transformation in international relations. There is a clear movement towards the peaceful solution of conflicts in many regions of the world. In this very context international institutions, and especially the United Nations, are regaining their place in international relations. Negotiations in many fields are producing significant results. Deep and essential political changes are taking place in central and eastern Europe. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs stated at the "open skies" conference in Ottawa, "the Europe of two ideologies and the confrontation based on them is becoming a thing of the past, though the two multilateral alliances still exist". At the same time these two military groupings are undergoing profound internal changes. More and more, past myths and illusions are dissolving. The black-and-white image of the enemy is giving way to a many-coloured image of the partner. These political processes have a direct impact on the vigorous dynamic of the United States-Soviet bilateral talks and the European disarmament negotiations, which promise an early and rich harvest. The need for effective verification and various confidence-building measures has deeply rooted itself as an essential element of disarmament agreements.

Against this background the slow progress, and to a considerable extent the stagnation, of our negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, the inability of our Conference to come to concrete results, are more and less well understood by many Governments and by public opinion. And it is quite understandable that more and more frequently we ask: What has been the role of the Conference on Disarmament in these processes? What role has it and should it play in the future? Is it not necessary to adjust it properly to a new situation? What can be done to increase the effectiveness of the work of this forum? As was observed in the statement made in this forum by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, "the 1990s will be a decade of opportunities and challenges and of hopes and hungers, all existing side by side".

We feel that proper answers to these highly pertinent questions will help us find the most efficient way to avoid the dangers and get the best out of existing and emerging opportunities, because opportunity seldom knocks twice. This does not mean that the goals and tasks of the Conference on Disarmament are easy and simple. But at the same time I suppose everyone will agree that they are much easier today than, let's say, 10 years ago. If we fail to find such answers, the prestige of the Conference could be further damaged and the Conference itself will be more and more marginalized.

Despite the limited results of the Conference's work in the last 10 years, my Government strongly believes that this forum continues to be an important and, in fact, indispensable organ of the world community. A simple test can prove it: let us imagine for a moment that there was no Conference on Disarmament. Undoubtedly, the necessity to have such a body would immediately emerge as a question of priority in international deliberations on security issues. The Conference is a vital forum, especially for small and medium-sized States, of which Poland is one, and we believe that questions in the field of disarmament should not all be left for the decision of great Powers, although we fully recognize their major and global responsibility.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The membership of the Conference, comprising all the nuclear Powers and the representatives of all regions, emphasizes the universal responsibility for disarmament. It is an essential forum in the search for any global solutions. The present trend towards the democratization of international relations, as well as new needs which seem to be emerging in disarmament efforts, will further increase the role and value of this forum and its potential contribution to international security and stability. Some of these requirements seem to be the following: substantial progress in negotiations between the USSR and the United States, and between Warsaw Treaty and NATO States, will be important, but will form just a portion of disarmament endeavours; and changes in the international system, and especially the clear trend towards a less bipolar world, will give a bigger political role to other Powers and regions and will require their greater involvement in disarmament efforts. If these assumptions are correct, then they form an additional justification for our discussion on how to make the work of the Conference more effective and better adapted to existing and future realities.

Let me present some considerations on the part of my delegation related to the organization of work and the agenda of the Conference. As far as the methods of work are concerned, our principal aim should be to make them more flexible and more responsive to real needs and opportunities. If there is a chance of progress we should be able to concentrate our efforts on this particular problem and to pursue them as long as necessary and desirable. Opportunities and the willingness to make progress should dictate the pace and the rhythm of our work, not a pattern of negotiations established in other circumstances or the time frames of routine openings and closings of sessions. In this very context the legitimate question arises of how to avoid protracted discussions on the establishment of subsidiary bodies repeated at the same time every year. One wonders whether this question could not be easily and effectively solved by drawing up a general mandate enabling each body to continue its work until its task has been accomplished.

It seems to our delegation that we should be more flexible in determining the goals of our endeavours and ways and means of achieving them which better correspond to challenges and possibilities. My delegation has already presented some ideas related to this dilemma; let me just refer to them very briefly. Undoubtedly, the elaboration of new agreements placing legal obligations upon States is and should remain the principal task of this Conference. This basis approach, in the opinion of my delegation, need not, however, prevent the Conference from undertaking other measures, particularly in circumstances where the stage of negotiations or other considerations make them advisable and the only ones feasible. In fact, different situations may require different approaches and responses. Why should we not envisage, for example, a kind of intermediate arrangement or protocol of understanding or joint recommendations or declarations on confidence-building and security-building measures? These documents, with the character of political obligations rather than fully-fledged legal instruments, could be properly recorded in our annual reports.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

We believe that this more flexible approach to the possible results of the work of the Conference can make it more productive. Different types of intermediate measures can play an independent role in building security and can at the same time gradually evolve into, or be a part of, binding international rules, thus helping the Conference in its treaty-making endeavour, which - let me stress again - should remain its main responsibility. The changing international situation, the movement towards new security perceptions and real changes in the strategic policies of States and alliances - all this seems to make the proposed approach even more feasible and desirable.

Finally, let us remember that according to the rules of procedure the agenda of our work is always established by ourselves for each year's session. We have the opportunity and, in fact, the obligation to review it and adjust it, if necessary, taking into account our experience and realities. We should approach such a re-evaluation with both caution and boldness, as well as with imagination. Very often we should ask ourselves whether it is better to continue our attempts to reach ambitious goals, with rather little chance of success, or whether it would be more effective to concentrate our efforts on other or more limited aims, but based on common interest and offering better prospects of a positive outcome. The choice is not easy. But at least we should not forget that sometimes such a choice exists, and that we are responsible for making appropriate decisions.

In our discussion on the agenda we need realism and understanding that we are touching on really delicate questions. It is doubtful that any discussion on such changes will bring rapid, positive and substantial results. It is also doubtful that radical changes are desirable. It seems to us rather that we need an "evolutionary" approach, a gradual adjustment to new situations, taking into account other developments, including the results of other disarmament negotiations. Change should not be made for the sake of change, as was rightly pointed out by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, but because of the perception of new opportunities.

My delegation is ready to consider any suggestions concerning the agenda of the Conference, if they are acceptable to other members of this body. We note those which have been already presented. We have also some ideas of our own. One of them is that the agenda of the Conference could include - apart from the questions of the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments - measures related, for example, to the "organization" of international security, in other words measures consolidating international security, for example a world early warning system. There is no other place where such measures can be discussed. They could become important "technical arrangements" complementing the United Nations collective security system and making it more effective. They could also facilitate discussion on some disarmament agreements.

These are just a few considerations and ideas related to the future work of the Conference. However, it is our hope that they complement the views of other delegations on this issue. But probably none of us has a clear idea of what is the proper remedy. In fact, what we need is our collective wisdom in order to approach the issue correctly and define proper responses.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The distinguished Ambassador de Azambuja - permit me to quote him again - rightly stressed that "this task could be handled ... at least in its preliminary stage, by a small group of our most experienced members". My delegation fully supports this conclusion. We believe that the revival of an informal Group of Seven or some other informal team has become highly desirable. Such a group should be entrusted, among other things, with collecting through a series of consultations all ideas and proposals the members of the CD may have in mind. My delegation is ready to present this group with our concrete proposals.

We also need intensive consultations on the more effective functioning of the Conference among all States and groups of States participating or interested in the work of this body. All of them should take an active part in these consultations. They should be carried out both in Geneva and between our capitals. It is, however, extremely important that they should not hamper the work of the Conference. This is the only condition my delegation attaches to this debate - whatever its form and content. Indeed, it would be a sad paradox if our discussions on increasing the effectiveness of the Conference paralysed its work.

It is also important for us not to forget that our debate on the future work of the Conference is not a new one. We have behind us efforts undertaken by the Group of Seven, headed by Ambassador Fan of China, and documents presented by this Group. New and interesting ideas concerning the principles of work and the agenda of the Conference have been submitted last session and this session.

My delegation proposes that the secretariat of the Conference should prepare a register or compilation of these ideas and suggestions. It would be of great help in our further thinking and could become a good starting-point for the debate in a body entrusted with in-depth analysis of the problem and the elaboration of appropriate recommendations. It goes without saying that until these recommendations have been endorsed by capitals they cannot commit any delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): May I first congratulate you, Mr. President, and your delegation on your accession to the presidency? I am delighted to see in the Chair a country with which my own has such very close relations, and I am sure we are all fortunate that our leadership is in the hands of a delegation so rich in diplomatic skills and experience.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

I asked for the floor to respond to references by the distinguished Ambassador of Iraq to my own country and, in particular, to recent events in Heathrow airport. It might be helpful if I began simply by reminding delegations of the facts. The facts are as follows:

On 28 March, United Kingdom customs officials prevented the export from Heathrow airport to Iraq of a number of highly sophisticated capacitors made by a United States company. The capacitors are designed to a military specification for use in the firing circuit of nuclear weapons. This was the culmination of an exercise run jointly over several months by the United Kingdom and United States customs authorities against EUROMAG, a United-Kingdom-based company. The Iraq Airways Station Manager in London, Mr. Omar Latif, has been served with a deportation order and a number of other persons have been arrested and will be committed to trial in the United Kingdom. Those are the facts.

The distinguished Ambassador of Iraq also speculated about the possible aims, I think, of my own country as well as those of others. I can only speak for the United Kingdom: our aims are very straightforward. They are to uphold our commitment that we have entered into under the non-proliferation Treaty and, more specifically, under article I of that Treaty. Perhaps I might just remind this meeting of what that article states.

> "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nulcear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

It was to fulfil those obligations that our action was aimed, and that was the sole aim. Similarly, we would look to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to scrupulously fulfil their obligations under article II of the Treaty. That article states that:

> "Each non-nulcear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In our view, activities which might call into question the fulfilment of this commitment should be condemned by all parties to the Treaty and by all supporters of the principle of non-proliferation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Solesby for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, my delegation also congratulates you on your accession to the presidency, and pledges its co-operation and full support in the work before all of us this month.

My delegation endorses fully the remarks just made by our distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom. Regarding the remarks made this morning concerning nuclear proliferation by the distinguished representative of Iraq, let me make the following brief comments.

The United States has expressed at the highest level its deep concern at recent evidence of possible undermining of the goals of the non-proliferation Treaty. Let me affirm that this is a serious concern - it is a concern that will not be turned aside by charges that it is educed for other purposes, or simply to smear the name of another country. The United States stands by its statements on this subject and will pursue this issue. Far from undercutting the non-proliferation system, the actions of the United States support it. What we would welcome is convincing information that the evidence that recently came to light does not represent erosion of NPT objectives. This would be far more constructive than threats addressed against the NPT system. In this connection, let me call attention again to a statement made by President Bush on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT Treaty on 5 March of this year:

> "It is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major progress in arms control, that the community of nations works together even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the greatest risks to the survival of mankind. ... I call upon all States party to the Treaty to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all countries."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Iraq.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq): I would like to be brief in stating a few points. Iraq is fully aware of its commitment under the NPT, and we challenge all those who spoke before me to produce one item of evidence which shows that Iraq is not living up to its commitment under the NPT. Those capacitors they are speaking about - they know very well that they have plenty of uses and not only one use. Professor Goldblat of SIPRI spoke on this on Swiss radio - I heard that - and he enumerated many uses for these capacitors. One of these uses is for oil exploration and production. Others say it could be used for scientific research in many places. It is, as we call it, a campaign of accusations, falsifications, as this very notion that has been spoken about by the distinguished representative of Great Britain. Why do they have to assume that these are going to be used to trigger a nuclear device? All nuclear activities in Iraq are under IAEA surveillance, all nuclear material - so to take this triggering device to trigger what? To trigger new aggression against Iraq and nothing else.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 5 April, when we reach the end of the list of speakers, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, will introduce the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of that Group, which will be circulated as an official document of the Conference under the symbol CD/981. As usual, members wishing to do so may comment on the progress report, as well as on the statement to be made by its Chairman. As is the practice in the Conference, we shall take action on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday 12 April.

I should also like to inform you that, owing to consultations to be held by the Secretary-General of the United Nations during his mission in Geneva, the Council Chamber will not be available this afternoon and tomorrow morning. Accordingly, the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which was to have been held in this conference room this afternoon will take place instead in conference room III. The meeting of the Group of 21 scheduled for tomorrow morning will be held in conference room V.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.549
5 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shahbaz (Pakistan)

GE.90-60577/1837B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 549th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Egypt and Argentina, as well as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Dr. Dahlman will introduce the Ad hoc Group's progress report, which is being circulated today as document CD/981. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elarabi.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): It is indeed a source of pleasure to see Pakistan presiding over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. Egypt and Pakistan have enjoyed, over the years, traditional excellent relations. We assure you, Mr. President, of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your duties. Your predecessor, Ambassador Ibnou Azikiwe of Nigeria, admirably guided our work during the month of March, and it gives me great pleasure to pay a sincere tribute to his contributions.

The year 1989 brought about unforeseen changes on the European scene, changes which will undoubtedly, in due course, have far-reaching repercussions throughout the world. It is generally accepted now that a new world order is evolving and a new security structure is emerging. What effect this evolving security structure will have on the Conference on Disarmament should be paramount in our deliberations. As the sole disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament has a responsibility to discharge. We should approach the new reality with an open mind - to enhance our contribution it may be necessary to adjust and update our agenda and review our working methods. Several representatives have rightly emphasized that the agenda must be reshaped so as to reflect better the new changes taking place, and to respond to such global challenges. My delegation wholeheartedly endorses this view.

One area which merits more attention is regional security. In such times of interdependence no single nation can find security by itself. World security, as a result, has become the aggregate sum of the security of all the regions around the globe. In the ultimate analysis international security rests on regional security.

A 1981 United Nations study on all the aspects of regional disarmament states in paragraph 143:

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

"... the regional disarmament concept must constantly be seen in its right perspective. Though in no way a substitute for general and complete disarmament, it can be an effective complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament. In particular it can facilitate negotiations on some of the areas identified for universal action, and contribute initiatives on other possible disarmament steps promoting stability, mutual confidence and co-operation within the region."

Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, in his statement of 13 March, highlighted the need to explore the possibility of discussing regional security questions and arms races outside the sphere of Europe. Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka also touched on the issue in his statement of 22 March. In the view of my delegation there are many independent regional initiatives which deserve our attention. One such initiative has been my country's proposal presented to the General Assembly since 1974 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. A group of experts was assigned the task of preparing a report on the subject. The Secretary-General will present the report to the General Assembly next fall. Can the Conference on Disarmament contribute in this regard? The Assembly has also in the past adopted a stream of resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa. The Disarmament Commission has failed up till now to reach consensus on this important regional issue. I believe all members of the OAU are entitled to expect this important regional disarmament measure to be put under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament.

During previous years aspects of regional disarmament were traditionally considered, inter alia, under the umbrella of item 8. This year there is an imbalance. No ad hoc committee on the comprehensive programme of disarmament has been established. A forum should therefore be devised to rectify this situation in order to afford regional issues suitable consideration. My delegation would like to propose a comprehensive discussion on the issue of regional disarmament within the framework of the CD.

I shall now turn to the chemical weapons convention. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the efforts of the former Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, and the five chairmen of the working groups, for their tireless efforts and their dedication to expediting the preparation of the draft convention. I also welcome the new Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and wish him success in his task.

Since I last addressed the subject of chemical weapons in plenary in August 1989, many events have taken place, including the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, the United States-USSR memorandum of understanding in Wyoming, the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Soviet-American joint statement of 10 February 1990. Yet a breakthrough towards a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons seems at present to be still beyond our reach. We recognize that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

We do, however, realize that we still have a long way to go to finalize the convention. This may be partially attributed to the fact that the 1989 session dealt mainly with "technical" issues. We understand very well the importance of resolving such technical aspects. In the course of the current session we hope meaningful progress can also be made on the political aspects of the draft convention.

Today, I wish to put before the Conference my delegation's reflections on some of these remaining questions.

An issue which attracts special attention, though from different standpoints, is that of the relation of the future convention on chemical weapons to other international agreements. It is our understanding that, in accordance with the general rules of international law and article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the chemical weapons convention, being a subsequent legal instrument on the same subject-matter, prevails over any existing international agreement covering the same subject-matter from the moment of its entry into force. Our work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol were transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Such attempts should be resisted in order to establish a non-discriminatory convention that contains one single universally applicable legal regime.

My delegation has raised this issue in the past. We consider it a political and not a legal one. No resolution to this problem has materialized, and it seems appropriate to propose that concerned delegations should consult further on this matter. We do hope that Ambassador Hyltenius will be able to reach a successful conclusion on this topic in his consultations on undiminished security.

Amendments are another important issue. This is a substantive and not a procedural matter. It entails highly political and legal considerations. It is the manner by which the parties to an agreement may alter the fundamental obligations when the need arises. With this in mind, the provisions on amendments, regardless of their formulation, should under no circumstances provide for a discriminatory regime that would consequently materialize in dual or multiple legal undertakings. The general rules contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may serve as guidelines in this respect.

A very important issue is that of sanctions. My delegation has been following closely the preliminary deliberations on this subject. The discussion over this question has clearly demonstrated the highly delicate political nature of the problem. It should be pointed out that the concept of sanctions is much wider than the incorporation of provisions on penal and punitive measures. We should strive for credible security guarantees. It is true that some of the material relevant to this subject is already scattered among the provisions of the draft convention. The end-product, however, should not be a weakened and fragmented edifice on the question of measures to redress situations of violation of and non-compliance with the convention. A clear-cut and credible provision should be expressly incorporated in a

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

separate and individual provision, the details and specificities of which may be referred to in relevant provisions, as currently demonstrated in several draft articles. The issue of sanctions will be one of direct cross-reference and linkage between the future Organization and the Security Council, which is the organ vested with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Confidentiali y cannot be delinked from the issue of verification. We have not yet been able to solve the difficult equation of verification versus confidentiality. Trial inspections have had a role in demonstrating this fact. It is true that a degree of progress in the work on confidentiality and on the guidelines for inspections has been achieved. However, a comprehensive solution to this problem is not in sight. The solution to it should be in the view of my delegation well founded on the inviolability of proprietary rights and information.

Challenge inspections are dependent, in our view, on the outcome of the work on confidentiality. It is highly sensitive and political because it affects the national security of each State party to the convention. The true test of the success of this device hinges on ensuring that no abuses are committed.

On the organizational aspects of the convention, I wish to emphasize the role of the Executive Council. The size and decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of the limits of the functional requirements, that is to say, the rapidity of convening meetings and the ability to take timely decisions. All States parties to the Convention should have an opportunity to serve on the Council. My delegation, moreover, does not subscribe to any attempt to create permanent seats.

My delegation has studied attentively the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States on the "Principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities". We subscribe to the view expressed in paragraph 2 (a), which stipulates that "Each State party should destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities ... beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing no later than 10 years, after the convention enters into force". We take it that such an obligation will not be subject to any reservation.

The Conference on Disarmament has been asked to take a decision on the creation of a new additional group in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to provide "Technical support for the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee". My delegation has studied this proposal. We appreciate the rationale behind it. However, we recognize the practical problems that lie ahead. One of these is the financial implications of this mechanism. The practical consequence of this is that the envisaged mechanism will result in a one-track dialogue of experts belonging to one group of States without due regard to equitable political and geographical distribution. Our preference is to channel all work through the subsidiary working groups of the Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Before concluding my remarks on this item, I wish to refer to the statement made by the Ambassador of Sri Lanka on 22 March when he pointed out that "it is ... necessary now to make a renewed effort to tackle the outstanding political issues with a view to taking a decision. Any deflection of the time available to matters of which some could best be handled by a preparatory commission could only lead to a diffusion of focus and loss of momentum". I believe that this point needs to be carefully considered by us.

Our aim is to conclude a convention which will be universally adhered to. One way of approaching this objective is to consider ways and means of involving all United Nations Members in the actual preparation of the convention at a certain stage. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference could positively contribute towards the universality that we all aspire to attain, and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I am particularly pleased to see you presiding over our deliberations. You are a member of a delegation which has left its mark on the efforts made in this forum. I remember Ambassador Ahmad's successful presidency in 1981 in the then Committee on Disarmament. I know that you and Ambassador Fanal, with whom I enjoy a special friendship, have applied your diplomatic skills to the renewed efforts that we must make in this negotiating body as we conclude the first part of our session.

The Conference on Disarmament is the only negotiating forum for disarmament in which States from Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania participate. This geographical representation confers on this body a unique character and gives it an advantage in concluding universal disarmament treaties which has not been fully utilized up to now. The negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban offer an example of the special characteristics of the Conference and show to what degree it is possible to advance multilaterally, even when sensitive and complex technical and political aspects are being dealt with, provided there is political will. This is particularly significant if we recall the context in which the structure of the convention began to develop. At that time the principal military Powers in the CW field, whether or not they were members of military alliances, maintained positions and views that originated in security perceptions stemming from a climate of confrontation. No doubt these circumstances affected the pace of work, but - and it is important to point this out - they did not prevent progress. It is, to some extent, understandable that the initial process was characterized by numerous precautions that left their mark on the negotiations. I wonder to what extent we should, today, continue to apply the same logic, and I can well imagine the queries that an inexperienced observer might raise on pausing to examine the text contained in document CD/961. As far as some aspects of the draft convention are concerned, it would seem that the fact that the convention is

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

to be implemented in future decades, and that therefore it cannot be viewed on the basis of past perceptions, is totally forgotten. One gets this feeling mainly because certain propositions regarding security are maintained as though they were dogmas. It is as if we did not allow reality to shed its light in the Council Chamber. And of course these propositions give rise to an entire body of provisions whose complexity increases in a geometric proportion to the degree of confidence pursued.

In order to avoid the paradox of drawing up an instrument whose assumptions do not fit in with the international trends that make it feasible, perhaps we should make a major effort to place security for all on a footing more in keeping with the times. We could thus envisage the simplification of the complex and burdensome mechanisms and procedures stipulated in the convention. It is highly unlikely that there could be a more effective guarantee of confidence than the transparency brought about by an international climate characterized by rational negotiations, the generation of a network of industrial, technological and scientific interests and intense international co-operation. My delegation is convinced that we are moving towards that goal. For that reason we consider it essential to maintain the momentum of international efforts to ban chemical warfare.

Several major events in 1989 brought the subject to the forefront of international attention. The multilateral negotiations on a convention continued to add to the enormous amount of work carried out since 1984, to take the date of the first negotiating mandate. In that climate of increasing interaction and understanding, there were bilateral agreements and initiatives that gave renewed vigour to the process and highlighted in particular the will of the United States and the Soviet Union to move forward towards the objectives of the convention. Now, in the final stage, the starring role in our opinion ought to be, and can only be, played by the Conference on Disarmament. In 1990, we would like to see in this room the eminent persons that made 1989 such a special year in the field of chemical weapons.

It is only logical that each of us around this table tends to highlight different aspects of the draft convention. From the standpoint of a State such as my own that has never possessed chemical weapons and does not possess them now, the effectiveness of this instrument depends basically on its ability to create a system that does not jeopardize the ensemble of elements that make up its perception of security. For developing countries, this implies taking into account indivisible factors of a political, economic and technological nature.

In August 1987, the then Argentine representative at the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Mario Campora, said that "the chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. ... Thus we have within our reach the possibility of drawing up a

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint".

This means that as of its entry into force, the convention must strike a proper balance between rights and obligations. For example, we should begin to consider including elements to compensate for and reduce the existing asymmetry among States parties during the 10-year period in which existing stockpiles will be destroyed. Furthermore, it implies agreement on a clear ban on the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances, as well as verification of compliance. The possibility that a State party to the convention might reserve the right to retaliate during the period of destruction cannot be justified in our way of seeing things, even from a military standpoint, inasmuch as the concept of chemical deterrence has fewer and fewer advocates. For the convention to be effective, basically, it must set up a rapid and transparent destruction mechanism. We share concern regarding the environment, and we believe it is indispensable to seek the assistance of the scientific community in order to find non-polluting methods that will allow us to reduce significantly the period of 10 years which has remained static so far. It would be unforgivable if we did not make every possible effort to minimize the Convention's legal weakness during this period. Linking the destruction of all chemical weapons to accession by certain States would seem to be equally unfavourable to the stability of the instrument. In our view, the purported aim of encouraging accession in this way could turn out to be counter-productive and foster tendencies that would in no way contribute to creating a chemical-weapon-free world. It is also important that we should endeavour to discourage initiatives that might lead a State to deem it prudent to wait until the end of the period of stockpile destruction before studying the desirability of acceding to the convention.

As is generally known, the verification system provided for in the draft convention is unprecedented in multilateral and bilateral disarmament treaties. It is clearly important to achieve an adequate verification system. But it is equally important to take into account the costs and benefits so that it does not constitute an excessive financial burden. In this regard, it might be necessary to consider, for example, whether it is appropriate to continue having a broad definition of chemical weapons embracing all toxic chemicals and not just those listed in the schedules, since that would mean that chemical activities in general would be subject to control and verification. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the need to implement an adequate inspection system and the aim of regulating chemical industry activity as a whole. For the sake of the convention's viability, there is a need to devise a verification régime which prevents interference that is not justified by the aims of the inspection. In this regard, the concept of "managed access", in so far as it entails the right to protect legitimate interests, provides a practical basis.

As regards various aspects of the convention now being negotiated, some delegations have attempted to press on us the concept of "CW-capable States". The debate on the general verification system which took place during the 1989 session demonstrated that different aims are being pursued on this

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matter, on which we would prefer not to draw any conclusions. However, we feel it necessary to point out that it is not particularly wise to put on an equal footing for the purposes of the convention countries that have stockpiles and those that have civil chemical industries of a certain size. There are only two types of State under the convention: those that possess chemical weapons and those that do not. Any additional category seems to be aimed more at supporting oligopolistic approaches rather than contributing to meeting the objectives of the convention. In this regard it would seem useful to put aside this concept that we have inherited from the joint Soviet-United States statements in the form of the expression "chemical-weapons-capable States".

When we design the Executive Council we should draw on the experience of the last four decades to improve on models that have not always proved satisfactory. The representativeness of this body must respond to objective guidelines and its size to practical needs. Membership should be based on the criterion of equitable geographical distribution. Furthermore, in terms of the effective application of the convention, the Council should adequately represent the entire international community. If we consider the membership of other executive organs of international organizations, they have around 50 members. The closest model is IAEA, whose Board of Governors works with 35 members; there have never been any complaints about its efficiency. In present international circumstances we would not be surprised if there were schools of thought once again evaluating the United Nations approach based on five regional groups. Bearing in mind what has been said by other delegations in favour of the industrial factor, we would not object to its being taken into account at the regional level. A system of counterweights would thus be achieved, avoiding an obvious imbalance in favour of the highly industrialized countries.

Before concluding, I should like to refer to the question of the prompt entry into force of the convention and various initiatives that States may adopt in pursuit of that objective. In 1987 we mentioned the possibility of reaching a political agreement at the regional level on arrangements for acceding to the convention. For that reason we support the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga at the plenary meeting on 15 March, for a meeting of Latin American and Caribbean countries to publicize the draft convention in order to create the conditions necessary for the convention's speedy entry into force. We hope that those regions that have not yet done so will follow suit.

Regional initiatives could go hand in hand with global initiatives to promote confidence in the convention. In this respect we could promote the idea that States which maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol should withdraw them, as Australia and New Zealand did in 1989. In this way the international legal régime banning chemical warfare would be strengthened while at the same time greater transparency and predictability in the international conduct of States would be achieved. In the same spirit it would be indispensable for those States which apply export controls to chemicals to issue declarations making it clear that these provisions would not be applied to States parties to the convention. A universal convention

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

which is to be applied in the coming century requires a political understanding to avoid the unilateral or plurilateral establishment of requirements additional to those already agreed to in the convention in order to participate in international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemistry.

Reality is providing us with many surprises. We hope that this climate will spread to the Conference on Disarmament and that in 1990 the surprise will be the finalization of the draft convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Before we proceed with the introduction and consideration of the progress report, I should like to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor on any other matter before the Conference. It seems not.

I shall now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the progress report of the Group's twenty-ninth session, as contained in document CD/981.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): It is a pleasure to report on the Group's recent meeting, held from 19 to 29 March, and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/981, which is in front of you today. This was the twenty-ninth session of the Group, and experts and representatives from 27 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended. We enjoyed the excellent eminent services provided by the secretariat throughout the session. We greatly appreciated their efforts and we are very impressed by the way they handled our technical material.

The second phase of the Group's Second Large-scale Technical Test which we refer to as GSETT-2, started on 15 January 1990. This phase, which will continue until our summer meeting, is designed as a gradual build-up of the testing of the entire system. The initial part of this phase involved the trial testing of existing facilities of the global system one day per week for eight weeks. The recent meeting of the Group had two main purposes: to review the results of this test period and to plan the remaining stages of GSETT-2.

The results of this first co-ordinated test of the components of the global seismic system of available facilities was quite satisfactory. Valuable experience was obtained by participating countries and facilities as well as by the Group as a whole. This was made possible because of careful planning guided by the co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, and the dedicated work of a large number of scientists and technicians at participating facilities around the world.

To operate a system in the real world differs considerably from conceptually designing it. Some of you may recall that during the Group's Technical Test in 1984, we received a message from one station saying "no data

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

available - seismometer stolen". This time considerable interruption occurred in data transmission when a communication computer at one of the experimental international data centres was the object of a similar crime.

Twenty-one countries participated in this initial stage of the global test by establishing and operating national data centres usually referred to as NDCs. These 21 NDCs provided data from 46 seismological stations in all. The data volumes contributed by the stations are considerably larger than in the 1984 test, which involved only parameter data. A total data volume corresponding to about 60,000 pages of typed information was exchanged during these eight days. This is about half the size of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Only the future will tell whether our data contain as much valuable information as those prestigious volumes.

The procedures for operating an NDC, collecting and compiling seismological data and transmitting such data to experimental international data centres are now well established. All countries which tried to establish and operate a national data centre were quite successful in doing so. This should encourage more countries to engage in the experiment.

Broader participation and better coverage of the globe is essential if we are to meet the objectives of GSETT-2. These objectives are, as you may recall, to test the individual components of a modern data exchange system as specified in the Group's fifth report (contained in CD/903), and to test the interaction of these components in a realistic environment - that is, to demonstrate that the system is able to cope with all the seismic events that are observed around the globe.

The Group noted with satisfaction that efforts are under way in some 10 additional countries to join the experiment and to establish national data centres. To encourage even wider participation the Group decided to reduce the technical requirements for participation in the experiment. While maintaining that the prime purpose of GSETT-2 was, and still is, to routinely exchange and analyse level II or wave-form data, the Group agreed that countries that today do not have facilities available for the routine exchange of digital wave-form data may participate by contributing level I or parameter data only. It is now technically possible for every country operating a seismological station - and most countries in the world actually do - to participate in GSETT-2. I do hope this will encourage additional participation in areas where we have only few participants today, in particular in South America, Africa and some parts of Asia.

The Ad hoc Group has for many years enjoyed close co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) for global data exchange through the WMO GTS, which is their Global Telecommunication System. The Group and the WMO representatives agreed that further preparatory work was needed to utilize this communication system during GSETT-2 as well.

The Group welcomed a suggestion by WMO that it should be represented in Geneva between 21 and 28 May 1990 at the forthcoming meeting of the World Meteorological Organization's Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

the Global Telecommunication System to further discuss this issue. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that, on the understanding that there are no financial implications for the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Peter Basham, Canada, assisted by Mr. Shigeji Suyehiro of Japan, should be requested to represent the Group at this meeting.

The experimental international data centres which we usually refer to as EIDCs, are operated in Canberra (Australia), Stockholm (Sweden), Moscow (USSR) and Washington in the United States. These centres are key elements of the system being tested during GSETT-2. Much effort and money have been devoted at these four centres to establishing adequate communication facilities and developing and introduring the hardware and software necessary to fulfil their demanding tasks. The introduction of the routine exchange and analysis of wave-form data, which are expected to substantially improve the quality of the results provided by the system, has significantly expanded the tasks of the EIDCs.

There is a saying that he who makes a journey has something to tell. This also applies to those who make scientific experiments. You thereby create new knowledge which is otherwise not available. Such valuable experience was gained at the experimental international data centres during the recent test period. It was found that the work-load was much heavier than expected and that the internal operations of the EIDCs have to be streamlined to allow for continuous operation over an extended period of time. To utilize the full potential of the wave-form data, the seismological methods and procedures have to be further developed and tested. Co-operation among the EIDCs to arrive at a common solution, a process usually referred to as reconciliation, is an important element of the analysis procedure. This was, however, not tested during this initial phase, mainly due to the overload at the EIDCs.

In the light of the experience accumulated so far, the Group revised its preliminary plans and instructions for GSETT-2, and agreed on a revised schedule which is annexed to the progress report.

During the time period until the Group's next session, phase 2 of GSETT-2 will continue with a number of activities, gradually building up to the envisaged full-scale operation of the system to be tested. These activities include the establishment of new national data centres in countries joining GSETT-2 and the establishment and testing of appropriate communication channels between these NDCs and EIDCs. Also included is work to improve the seismological procedures at EIDCs for analysis of wave-form data in particular, and the testing of such procedures among the EIDCs. An informal meeting of experts primarily from the four EIDCs will be hosted by the United States in early June 1990 to review the results of this work. A preparatory operational test will also be conducted involving the exchange of data from all participating stations and the processing of these data at the EIDCs for four days in late June.

The Group also discussed the schedule for phase 3, which is the main phase of GSETT-2. To be able to develop the analysis procedures to take full

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

advantage of reported data, in particular the wave-form data, and to enable additional countries - and this is important - to make the necessary preparations, the Group decided to revise the preliminary schedule. The Group now plans to divide the third phase into two parts. The first part consists of one full week of continuous operation of the entire system to be conducted in late autumn, tentatively mid-November, this year. The second and main part of phase 3 will be a full-scale operation for a continuous period of about two months in April and May 1991. Such a schedule, which allows for both intensive testing and careful analysis and evaluation, is considered by the Group to provide the best foundation on which to build a scientifically sound assessment of the proposed system.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened from 30 July to 10 August 1990, in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for introducing the report contained in document CD/981. Does any other delegation wish at this stage to address the progress report of the Ad hoc Group?

As is the practice in the Conference, I shall put the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report before the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday, 12 April. The recommendation contained in paragraph 13 relates to the suggested dates for the next session of the Ad hoc Group - 30 July to 10 August 1990. As regards paragraph 9, the secretariat has circulated today the draft of a letter that I as President of the Conference will address to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the participation of a member of the Seismic Group in the next session of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on the Global Telecommunication System. I am doing so to comply with rule 11 of the rules of procedure, which provide that the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with other international organizations. If there are no objections to the text of the letter before the plenary meeting of Thursday, 12 April, that letter will be sent as drafted.

I should like now to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and can be amended, if needed. As you can see, provision is made on Tuesday, 10 April for the first informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after the plenary meeting to be held on that date, as agreed by the Conference at its 547th plenary meeting. I should also like to inform you that Friday, 13 April and Monday, 16 April are official holidays for the United Nations Office at Geneva and that therefore no technical

(The President)

services can be provided on those dates. Accordingly, no meeting are planned in the timetable for Friday, 13 April. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.550
10 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan)

GE.90-60639/1788B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 550th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I am now assuming the responsibilities of President of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to make the following statement on behalf of the Pakistan delegation.

It is an honour for Pakistan to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the most important multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, for the month of April 1990.

The international political climate today is characterized by a marked relaxation of tensions, growing understanding between the super-Powers and progress towards the resolution of regional conflicts. The improved global political situation has raised hopes that significant disarmament measures may be adopted in the near future.

While welcoming the relaxation of tensions between the super-Powers, we would also like to hope that the changed political environment will encourage moves towards regional peace and disarmament. It is necessary that detente and mutual understanding should spread to all regions of the world. It is also essential that the international community should whole-heartedly support and encourage all efforts directed towards regional disarmament, as only in this manner can the equal and undiminished security of all States at the lowest level of armaments be guaranteed.

Pakistan welcomes the progress achieved in East-West arms control. The conclusion of the INF Treaty and the prospects for an agreement on deep cuts in strategic weapons during 1990 are significant steps towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Equally significant are the successful conclusion of the Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the commencement of talks on confidence-building and security-building measures (CSBMs) and conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE).

We welcome talks between the super-Powers and between the two major alliances on disarmament issues. However, we continue to believe that they cannot be a substitute for multilateral negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations, where the vital security interests of the smaller countries would also be taken into account and protected. The Conference on Disarmament provides the most appropriate forum for this purpose. We must make optimum use of this multilateral forum for progress towards meaningful disarmament.

In view of the sea change in threat perceptions following upon the transformation in the international environment, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament must pay special attention to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. The Conference on Disarmament must also examine issues which are increasingly engaging the attention of the international community, such as regional disarmament and naval disarmament.

(The President)

As we stand on the threshold of a new era, we must rededicate ourselves to the goal of general and complete disarmament as an important basis for the future structure of international peace and security. We must undertake efforts at both global and regional levels for progress towards this goal.

Disarmament is a necessary condition for the physical survival and the economic and social progress of humanity. It is indeed regrettable that enormous expenditure is incurred annually on armaments while the majority of mankind continues to suffer from grinding poverty.

We would like to urge that material and human resources should be diverted by all countries of the world from military uses towards the amelioration of the existing economic conditions of humanity, particularly in the developing countries. Hopefully the current favourable international climate will lead to the adoption of significant disarmament measures at the global and regional levels, leading to the utilization of the resources thus saved for the progress and prosperity of mankind.

We are convinced of the need to break out of the vicious cycle of insecurity, armaments and underdevelopment. This can be done if we sincerely and faithfully adhere to the United Nations Charter and pursue genuine disarmament which guarantees the security and independence of all States irrespective of their size or political inclinations. Pakistan will continue to work with the international community towards a future free from the threat of war, hunger, poverty and disease.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As decided by the Conference at its 547th plenary meeting, we shall hold today, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting of the Conference on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Austria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Egypt and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska.

Mr. CESKA (Austria): Mr. President, let me start my statement by expressing my satisfaction at seeing you personally in the Chair, and saying that I am particularly pleased to express through you my best wishes to Pakistan for its presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the month of April. I am sure that this augurs well for the conclusion of this year's spring session of the Conference on Disarmament.

My statement today will not deal with the question of chemical weapons; let me point out, however, that Austria has finalized and will submit to the Conference before the end of the spring session a comprehensive report on an Austrian national trial inspection.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

Nuclear weapons were invented several decades ago and have since become a fact of life. Nuclear weapons do exist, and we can therefore not realistically expect a return to the status quo ante. What matters under present conditions, however, is their non-proliferation as well as their gradual reduction. Nuclear weapons always involve risk, even if they are meant as a deterrent only. It is therefore logical to keep the number of countries in possession of nuclear weapons as small as possible. Any further spread would increase the risk and make the world less safe.

On a global strategic scale the deterrent of second strike capability has worked so far, and has indeed been a stabilizing factor. Whether this deterrent has prevented a major military conflict which otherwise would have taken place is an interesting question which nobody can definitely answer. There is no need to do away with this system as long as it cannot be replaced by anything better.

The deterrent of second strike capability and strategic arms reduction do not exclude each other. The concept of second strike capability relies first and foremost on its predictability, in the sense that the other side must be totally certain that a first strike will immediately entail a counterstrike. This, however, does not require the presently existing quantities of nuclear weapons. Indeed, a second strike capability can be maintained at a much lower level. The risk inherent in nuclear weapons is linked not only to the number of States holding such arms, but also to the size of such armouries. Lower levels of nuclear weapons therefore mean lower risk - something the entire world has an interest in.

There is great potential for strategic arms reduction before we are eventually faced with the question of minimum standards, i.e. the levels necessary to preserve credible second strike capabilities. The conclusion of a START agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear forces would certainly not undermine the system of second strike capability, but at the same time it would considerably reduce risk - the risk involved with any given quantity of nuclear weapons - as well as costs.

In Europe we are confronted with a somewhat different situation. The INF Treaty has fundamentally downgraded the potential of nuclear escalation by doing away entirely with its land-based intermediate nuclear forces dimension. What remains are short-range nuclear forces, but even they might gradually become less important with changing military doctrines when, at the same time, they become less acceptable for the countries concerned in view of the encouraging political and economic developments under way in the region. We therefore have reason to be optimistic.

As a neutral country, Austria is particularly concerned about nuclear weapons whose effects can easily spill over into territories not involved in a military conflict. Austria therefore attaches great importance to, and takes a legitimate interest in, nuclear disarmament on a global scale, and, given the country's location in the centre of Europe, in the European region especially. We encourage the countries concerned to vigorously pursue these efforts regarding nuclear disarmament and thereby make the world a safer place. In this context, Austria would particularly welcome a treaty on the elimination of land-based short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

Addressing more specifically the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, let me turn to the forthcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September this year. This review conference will once again provide an opportunity to evaluate the implementation of the Treaty.

It is certainly correct to state that all countries have benefited from the existence of the Treaty. This should in turn reinforce the case for its further strengthening. The treaty has not only prevented a general spread of nuclear weapons, but has also greatly facilitated co-operation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In this respect, a tribute has to be paid to the work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and its safeguards system.

With regard to the extension of the Treaty beyond the year 1995, Austria - I can refer here to the statement of the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois Mock, on 6 February 1990 before this Conference - is in favour of such an agreement being reached well before 1995. This would allow a much clearer picture as to the need to hold two conferences, namely one regular review conference and one conference on the extension of the Treaty in 1995. In this context again, let me stress that Austria fully subscribes to the legal view that the Treaty will not under any circumstances expire after 1995.

Austria attaches considerable importance to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Austria's participation, since 1979, in the work of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts entrusted with the task of preparing a feasible verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a clear reflection of its interest in working for a rapid solution of all outstanding technical questions involved. Austria is aware of the significance of the current working phase, and will do its utmost to further enhance its contribution in this field. However, as the elaboration of a comprehensive verification system should constitute a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of such a treaty, this will probably take additional time. In this context let me say that, after over 20 years of listening to arguments explaining why comprehensive and satisfactory verification does not seem to be feasible, we are very satisfied to find ourselves in a position to state today that it is in fact feasible.

Financial arguments do not seem to stand in the way of verifying a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, since one year of operating a comprehensive verification system in its form as currently envisaged would only cost the equivalent of one nuclear weapon test. Therefore, we expect the nuclear-weapon States to make provision for the necessary financial contributions for the world-wide installation of such a verification system as a first and most logical expression of the "peace dividend".

As far as the outstanding technical questions are concerned, we hope that the envisaged work programme for phases 2 and 3 of the practical test in 1990 and 1991 will lead to final conclusions. In this regard, the participation of as large a number of States as possible seems to be of the utmost importance for raising global awareness and eventually facilitating the world-wide implementation of such a verification system.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

As far as the initiative aiming at the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime by amending the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty is concerned, let me state that Austria does not consider the forthcoming amendment conference an adequate means to achieve this goal. In particular, the amendment of an existing treaty prior to final solution of outstanding technical as well as political problems cannot be regarded as a feasible option.

The concept of legally binding assurances given by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States can, it would seem to us, never really serve its purpose. In a politically stable international environment, there would probably be no need for such assurances, whereas in the event of international crises, even legally binding assurances would not give adequate protection, unless nuclear weapons were under international control. Additional problems are related to definitions of terms such as "nuclear-weapon State", and to a feasible verification régime. Therefore, real progress, let alone the conclusion of a legally binding instrument, is not to be expected for the near future.

Regarding the prohibition of radiological weapons, it is tempting to conclude that the initial expectations of easy negotiations in this respect have proved to be unrealistic. Therefore, the finalization of legally binding instruments is beyond reach, at least in the short term. The prohibition of radiological weapons in the narrow sense involves difficulties since, according to common understanding, such weapons are not in existence yet. The problem of verifying such non-existent weapons seems to go beyond feasible solutions. The prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes raises similar problems, at least in its current methodological approach. Only the prohibition of attacks on any nuclear installation would, in our view, lead to satisfactory solutions. Distinctions between criteria of definition, such as use for military purposes or military headquarters, would, however, not allow adequate verification.

Let me conclude these remarks on a more general note. What we have first and foremost in mind in disarmament talks, in particular in multilateral forums like this Conference, is to further strengthen stability in a still antagonistic environment. The current forces of change at work give reason to be optimistic - probably more than ever before in the post-war era - and to hope that systemic antagonism can gradually be overcome. If we can all subscribe to common ideals, commit ourselves to a world-wide division of labour and thereby accept the consequent economic interdependence, there will be less cause for conflict and the world as a whole will be better off. Disarmament should then be just a matter of course.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, let me first say how pleased my delegation is at seeing you presiding over the Conference. You represent a country which plays an important role in the Conference and in the Group of 21, to which both Sweden and Pakistan have belonged for many years. You have also personally taken a very active part in the work on the many vital

(Mr. Ryltenius, Sweden)

matters before us, and I am convinced that with your well-known skill, experience and dedication to this work, we shall make further substantive progress during your presidency. I should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, and to congratulate him on the very successful manner in which he guided the Conference during the month of March.

The nuclear issues are priority items for this Conference. In my intervention today I will concentrate on these items on our agenda, including radiological weapons and negative security assurances. I will also take the opportunity to touch upon the forthcoming fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The repeated calls for an urgent comprehensive test-ban treaty by the vast majority of the Member States of the United Nations General Assembly constitute authoritative support for the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a CTBT. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the efforts carried out last year by Ambassador Yamada of Japan, and continued this year by his successor, Ambassador Donowaki, have created better conditions for a dialogue on the issue of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. I hope that there will be enough flexibility in the Conference to agree on a reasonably balanced mandate, allowing us, at last, to get down to business on a CTBT. An ad hoc committee should be established without further delay.

Already in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty expressed their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The initiative to try to advance the issue through an amendment conference, with the aim of transforming the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty, is an expression of the frustration over the lack of results on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the United States are about to reach agreement on verification arrangements for their bilateral threshold test-ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. Thresholds of 150 kilotons do not impose meaningful limitations on nuclear testing. If linked to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a lowering of the threshold to yields below one kiloton would be a significant advancement towards such a treaty. In such a context, agreed reductions in existing nuclear-weapon stockpiles would be truly effective.

On the important issue of verifying a nuclear test-ban treaty, considerable progress has been achieved. The ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has, through close international co-operation, developed a global seismic verification system. A modern design of this system is now being tested. The experiment is proceeding successfully, but there is a need for increased participation in the test in order to achieve a more global distribution of seismic stations. In fact, many countries have technical facilities making it possible for them to participate in this global experiment. It is important that more States should take the necessary political decision allowing for broader participation. This would effectively contribute to the development of a global seismic verification system.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Among other verification measures for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity may be mentioned. It has on a number of occasions been discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, and Sweden has proposed that a global system should be established for this purpose. On-site and in-country monitoring stations, as well as satellite-based surveillance systems, can also play an important part in verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On the basis of an extended mandate, the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts should start deliberations on these verification techniques too, drawing on the experience developed over a long period of time in this Group.

After this plenary meeting the Conference will have occasion to deliberate in an informal plenary meeting on agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The convening of informal plenary meetings is the result of successful consultations carried out by Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria as President of the Conference during the month of March. Item 3 on our agenda "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", will be subject to consideration in the same format later on. The Swedish delegation welcomes this opportunity to discuss these matters, and hopes that ad hoc committees will be established for continued work at next year's session of the Conference.

My delegation has proposed that considerations under agenda item 2 should include the issue of naval nuclear armaments and disarmament. Naval nuclear weapons, integrated as they are in overall military defence structures, should not be excluded, as they have largely been, from considerations on nuclear disarmament. More than one nuclear weapon in four in existence is earmarked for deployment at sea.

There is widespread concern over the risks related to nuclear weapons at sea in the context of unintentional nuclear war. My delegation is of the opinion that this question should be considered under agenda item 3. Under this agenda item questions covering increased openness, transparency and confidence-building measures in nuclear matters should be dealt with. Sweden has proposed that the issue of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea should be taken up in this context, as such incidents may play an ominous role in escalation into a nuclear war.

Another subject which, in the view of my delegation, should be considered at the informal plenary meetings under agenda item 3 is the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. This would seem to correspond to an emerging international norm against the use of nuclear weapons. The declaration by the two major nuclear-weapon States that a nuclear war must never be fought supports a process of de-legitimization of nuclear weapons. My delegation considers that the time is ripe to explore the possibilities of comprehensively banning the use of nuclear weapons, in an appropriate, legally binding form.

Means to enhance the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States have been discussed throughout the genesis and the existence of the non-proliferation

(Mr. Ryltenius, Sweden)

The Swedish Government attaches great importance to the future viability of the non-proliferation regime. In its view, the fourth review conference regarding the non-proliferation Treaty stands out as a major event. With the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT review conference taking place at the end of this month we are now entering the final phase of the preparatory work. Up to now the preparations have been running smoothly. Organizational matters have to a large extent been settled, and valuable background documents have been produced and discussed. It is my belief that

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The NPT is not yet a universal treaty. Although new States have successively joined, thus reinforcing the Treaty, some important States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities have hitherto rejected adherence. Two nuclear-weapon States are also still missing from the ranks of NPT States parties. The credibility of the non-proliferation régime continues to be threatened.

The contribution of the NPT to world security and stability has often been evoked. In a period of drastic and rapid political change, with promising developments in many parts of the world, the Treaty as a positive element of stability plays an increasingly important role. Therefore, the NPT should be maintained and reinforced. The positive decision to renounce nuclear weapons contributes, in the view of my delegation, to strengthening the security of each individual State choosing this option. Sweden's decision to this effect and its subsequent adherence to the NPT were based on the assessment that its security would be best served without nuclear weapons. As the then Swedish Prime Minister expressed it: "That which should be our protection could equally well be transformed into the greatest threat to our neutrality and our peace". Sweden reiterates its call to all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT - one of the most important post-war treaties in the field of disarmament, with more than 140 parties.

As long as nuclear weapons exist they pose a threat to the very existence of mankind. Their destructive power surpasses imagination. States with the power to decide about the use of nuclear weapons - as well as those who may plan to acquire such weapons - are not only gambling with the survival of their own countries; they are also putting in jeopardy the lives of us all. It must be perfectly clear that they have a responsibility to us - the have-nots - too. Three of the nuclear-weapon States are parties to the NPT. They have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Have these undertakings been fulfilled?

An important agreement, the INF Treaty, was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States a few years ago. An agreement on reducing their arsenals of strategic weapons will hopefully emerge soon. Sweden welcomes these efforts. But, as was pointed out by the Director-General of IAEA here in Geneva not long ago, there are more nuclear warheads in the world today than in 1968, when the NPT and its article VI were agreed.

All avenues should be explored in order to find new ways to reduce the nuclear weapon arsenals. In parallel, one measure of both practical and symbolic significance of the highest order would be the establishment here in the CD of an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Sweden has further proposed to the General Conference of IAEA that all transfers of weapons material to peaceful use should be verified through the application of Agency safeguards. If the nuclear material cannot immediately be used within peaceful programmes, the Agency's statute provides an instrument for storage under its custody.

(Mr. Ryttenius, Sweden)

Similarly, all production of new nuclear materials for military purposes must cease. This idea is not new. From 1956 to 1969 the United States repeatedly proposed such a "cut-off". A United Nations General Assembly resolution on this issue sponsored by a large number of States has been adopted with an overwhelming majority for many years. If an undertaking to discontinue such production is to be credible it must be verifiable through inspection and constant surveillance. A pre-condition for a verifiable "cut-off" is a separation in the nuclear-weapon States of peaceful and military nuclear activities, whereby IAEA safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities without exception. Sweden therefore urges all nuclear-weapon States to take measures to this effect.

The nuclear issues concern all the members of this Conference, and to each all members of the international community. They cover a broad spectrum of our agenda. It is high time that they were addressed in earnest, if this Conference is to live up to its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. There are many ideas on how to improve the functioning of this body, and my delegation intends to revert to that matter in due course. However, no procedural or organizational improvements can compensate for the fact that it is the lack of political will to negotiate on some of the most pressing items of our agenda that is the real problem of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ryttenius, for his very comprehensive statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, let me say first how pleased my delegation is at seeing you, the distinguished representative of friendly Nigeria, presiding over our Conference for the month of April. I am certain that under your able stewardship our work will be fruitful. Allow me also to take this occasion to congratulate your predecessor, the Ambassador of Algeria, His Excellency Mr. Ennaka Ago Aziakpe, on his excellent performance and formidable efforts in organizing our deliberations.

At today's session of the Conference on Disarmament I would like to present document CD/982 on the national trial inspection conducted in my country in the month of February this year.

Ever since the beginning of the negotiations on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, Yugoslavia has supported all the proposals related to verification measures. We are of the opinion that a verification system has to be efficient and cost-effective on the one hand, and on the other should include a well-balanced set of verification measures and should safeguard the sovereignty of all parties to the convention. The work to date within the Ad hoc Committee gives reason for optimism that these requirements will be met.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia neither produces nor possesses chemical weapons. However, we consider that last year's national trial inspection activity, which is being continued this year too, represents, as has been pointed out several times at the Conference, an important step in creating confidence among the parties to the convention and creating pre-conditions for multilateral inspection.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

As early as 1984, in document CD/482, Yugoslavia submitted a proposal on the scope of national verification, and the role, tasks and composition of the national team. Document CD/613 of 10 July 1985 contains a proposal whereby large-scale chemical industry production facilities should be subject to national verification measures. Many countries have already indicated, through their national trial inspections, possible solutions to problems resulting from such procedures. They have shown that the task is not an easy one, and that it requires a clear definition of the volume of work to be done, the tasks of each member of the inspection team and the role of the facility representatives, which can be a very useful one in dealing with and defining complex operations.

Against the background of experience with numerous national trial inspections, we organized a routine inspection of a plant for the production of chemicals declared under schedule [3] of the annex to article VI of the draft convention, as we do not produce chemicals listed under schedule [2]. A national trial inspection was organized to check that the facility was not being used to produce any chemicals other than the declared ones, and that the quantity produced was equal to the quantity declared. The inspection also checked the applicability of the relevant provisions of the draft convention.

The facility concerned is part of the PIB company - Industry of Basic Chemistry, Baric-Beograd - which produces organic chemicals. The chemical which was the object of our inspection was phosgene, listed under schedule [3]. The trial inspection was conducted in two phases. First, on its initial visit, the inspection team toured the facility to get acquainted with the production programme. The initial visit took two days, after which the details of the inspection were agreed upon. The second phase of the trial inspection was conducted in one day; the actual procedure of the inspection did not interfere with the normal operations of the facility. This phase was followed by the preparation of the report of the inspection team.

Both on its initial visit and during the routine inspection, the inspection team was composed of five members. The team included a chemical engineer (team leader) and a specialist in physical and chemical methods of analysis, both of them representatives of research institutes. In addition, the routine on-site inspection was attended by representatives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Secretariat for the Chemical Industry in the Chamber of Economy.

The main conclusion of the inspectors on the basis of the information presented was that the characteristics of the facility corresponded to the standard features for the continuous production of phosgene. They concluded that a quantitative inspection of the process can be conducted either on the basis of the automatic records of raw materials and products (material balance), or on the basis of the inspection of technological parameters, also automatically recorded.

As it is specifically designed for the production of phosgene, the facility is not multi-purpose, and it is therefore doubtful whether such a facility can produce any other chemicals listed either under schedule [3] or under schedules [1] and [2]. In addition, several conclusions were drawn. A number of basic requirements have to be fulfilled for the inspection to be

(Mr. Kusin, Yugoslavia)

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kusin, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): Mr. President, it is a source of great pleasure for my delegation to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament and to take the floor, once more, during the presidency of Pakistan. Your wide experience and your diplomatic skills are well known to all of us, and I am confident that these skills will help steer our deliberations in the spring session to a successful conclusion.

The subject of my intervention today is agenda item 5 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Since 1982 the Conference on Disarmament has had this important subject before it. In 1985, an agreement was reached on a mandate which made the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with this subject possible. That mandate, however, fell short of our expectations. Nevertheless, we accepted such a non-negotiating mandate in the hope that, by allowing the Ad hoc Committee to work, we could generate a growing momentum

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

commensurate with the well-deserved importance accorded to the item. Instead, we have witnessed throughout the last few years deliberate attempts to weaken the work of the Ad hoc Committee and prevent it from attaining any form of progress, meaningful or otherwise.

Annually, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space becomes the last subsidiary body to be established by the Conference on Disarmament. Such an imbalance must be avoided, and the Ad hoc Committee should be established early in the session in order to allow a structured and candid discussion on all related matters.

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and carries hope for future generations. Substantive and serious work must be allowed to take place in the Ad hoc Committee. General Assembly resolution 44/112 requested the Conference on Disarmament, in paragraph 7, to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad hoc Committee at the 1989 session of the Conference and at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

It is an established fact that United Nations activities are anchored on the concept of the exploration of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all States. In other words the concept of declaring outer space as the common heritage of mankind, and not subject to national appropriation, has been universally accepted since 1967. It is also conventional wisdom that the common interest of all mankind requires that the progress in the exploration and use of outer space be confined to peaceful purposes.

The 1967 outer space Treaty, which is universally considered as the primary and most authoritative source of international law regulating State activities in outer space, remains at the heart of the legal regime governing outer space. Before any attempt at analysing some of its relevant provisions, a few brief points should be noted. First, the 1967 outer space Treaty is a by-product of 1960s space technology. We are now at the threshold of the twenty-first century. Second, the pace and volume of technological developments since its adoption has been staggering. What was considered science fiction in the 1960s has already been attained or will soon be within our reach. Third, legal norms as a general rule should not be allowed to lag far behind technology.

The article in the Treaty relevant to our present discussion is article IV, which stipulates that parties should not "place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner". The article goes on to state that "the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes".

Here I would like to pause and present the following comments. First, article IV clearly contains a built-in limitation. Its scope does not extend to banning all types of weapons in outer space. It prohibits, inter alia, the placing, installing or stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction only. Its provisions do not therefore contain a clear-cut

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

injunction to ensure that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The principle of exclusive use for peaceful purposes applies only to the Moon and other celestial bodies. The only restriction placed on States parties pertains to the prohibition of the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapon and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies. What this means is that there is an inherent contradiction in the same article of the Treaty, thereby creating, as a result, not one but two legal régimes; one applicable to outer space and the other confined to the Moon and other celestial bodies.

A 1987 study prepared by UNIDIR accurately defined the present situation as follows:

"Different rules are established for outer space proper, on the one hand, and for the Moon and other celestial bodies, on the other. In the first case, what is involved is only a limited prohibition which, for example, does not prohibit the placing in orbit of non-nuclear ASAT or anti-missile weapons. In the second case, exclusive use for peaceful purposes entails more substantial restrictions, without necessarily going as far as total demilitarization. Because of its limited scope, the outer space Treaty left open the possibility of the introduction of weapons in space, other than nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, in particular ASAT weapons and space-based AVM systems."

From another perspective, several interpretations of the term "peaceful purposes" have been advanced. Peaceful purposes may mean "non-military" or "non-aggressive". As far as my delegation is concerned, a total ban on all non-peaceful uses of outer space should be our ultimate objective. Many delegations expressed similar views when the outer space Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1966. Egypt has consistently advocated this view.

Before concluding this point I would like to address one further aspect, namely that of offensive in contrast to defensive uses of outer space. Some States argue that defensive militarization of outer space is permissible. It is the considered view of my delegation that the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the contemporary rules of international law pertaining to outer space do not bear out this argument, for several reasons. Firstly, the Charter of the United Nations does not deal, as such, with the definition of what is defensive or offensive. The Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Secondly, the Charter recognizes the right of legitimate self-defence if an armed attack occurs, a fact also endorsed by rules of customary international law. Thirdly, the major difference between outer space and terrestrial space emanates from the special nature of outer space as the common heritage of mankind. A State has an inalienable sovereign right to use its territory for military purposes in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter. Outer space, however, is not part of the territory of any State and cannot be subject to the exercise of national jurisdiction. It follows that States should refrain from militarizing what belongs to mankind as a whole.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that ambiguity surrounds the concepts of offensive versus defensive uses of outer space, this should not become a licence for States to increase military activities in outer space in a manner inconsistent with the principle of preserving space for peaceful purposes and preventing an arms race from occurring in outer space.

It is for these reasons that my delegation attaches great importance to the deliberations of, and the work conducted in, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is therefore essential that the Committee should enter into substantive discussions on ways and means of preventing an arms race in outer space by elaborating on the existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to arriving at concrete recommendations. The procedural wrangle that delays our work every year should not be allowed to continue.

Canada has always played a most constructive role on outer space matters, and my delegation would like to assure Ambassador Shannon of Canada, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, of our full co-operation and wish him success in his endeavours.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me personally. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Lüdeking.

Mr. LÜDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on taking up the presidency for the month of April. My delegation is satisfied to see you in the Chair presiding over the Conference during this month. At the same time, I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, for the effective way in which he conducted the work of the Conference during the month of March.

The issue of verification of compliance is of crucial importance in our negotiations on a comprehensive global convention banning chemical weapons. And we knew from the outset that this issue would be one of the most difficult to resolve. Following intensive negotiations over the past years, a coherent verification system has been elaborated designed to reliably assure all States parties that the provisions of the convention are being complied with. This well-developed system consists of three basic elements: verification of declared CW stocks and production facilities, as well as their destruction; verification of non-production of chemical weapons, i.e. the monitoring of relevant non-prohibited activities in the chemical industry; and clarification and verification procedures in case of ambiguous situations and doubts about compliance. The conceptual approach underlying this verification system is sound. Last year's discussions on the pattern of verification testified to that. They also demonstrated that this approach is broadly accepted and considered to provide the basis for reliable and effective verification.

Last year's discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons also focused on possible additional verification measures which are to supplement the existing ones already provided for in our "rolling text". As early as January 1988 my delegation put forward a proposal for ad hoc checks, a

(Mr. Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

verification measure designed to complement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We did so in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry.

Ad hoc checks were designed to provide for a flexible, easily implementable and unintrusive means of verification at the disposal of the Technical Secretariat covering all facilities in the chemical industry which can be misused for the production of chemical weapons. Following our initial proposal, which was subsequently further developed in the course of the discussions (cf. CD/869 of 6 September 1988), other suggestions for strengthening the existing verification system have been put forward. In this regard I would like to mention specifically the very interesting and important proposal by the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections.

The proposals which were put forward differed in their conceptual approach. However, the concerns which lay behind them were basically the same. The discussions on ad hoc verification, although they have not yet been conclusive, have contributed to greater awareness of the verification problem to be addressed by ad hoc verification. We welcome the determination of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, to press for an early solution to this still outstanding problem in our negotiations.

In yesterday's meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons Australia presented a discussion paper which suggests an approach to ad hoc verification, which combines elements of the proposals of both the United Kingdom delegation and my delegation. This new proposal might provide a basis for our future discussions on the subject. It might also contribute to finding a solution to the issue of ad hoc verification acceptable to all. My delegation looks forward to in-depth consideration of the issue of ad hoc verification in the coming weeks. The proposal submitted yesterday by Australia provides an outline, which will have to be further fleshed out.

Since the extensive discussions undertaken in the course of the spring part of last year's session, my delegation has further explored the issue of national registers with a view to providing a manageable and effective solution. Our results are contained in a working paper, advance copies of which have been distributed this morning. In my statement today I have no intention of further discussing the concept of national registers suggested in our paper. Let me, however, just point out that in our view national registers are an indispensable element of any routine ad hoc verification mechanism as they would provide the necessary binding declaration basis. As such they would provide a comprehensive picture of the relevant parts of the chemical industry, listing all plant sites which can possibly be misused for the production of chemical weapons. In devising our approach for the establishment of national registers it was not only our aim to meet this objective. We also took account of the requirement that the approach must be feasible and easily implementable by States parties. In addition it had to be ensured that confidential information is protected. It is my hope that our proposal provides a good working basis. My delegation is looking forward to discussing it in detail during forthcoming meetings on the subject within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation presented its views on challenge inspections in some detail in a statement earlier this session. On that occasion we were also able to present a report on our first trial challenge inspection in a military facility. Today I would like to introduce the report on our second trial challenge inspection. The report has been distributed this morning as document CD/983. This trial challenge inspection, again conducted in a military facility, was intended in particular to provide practical experience with inspection methods and equipment. The results are encouraging: we were able to conclude that portable testing and analysis equipment already available can be put to effective use in a challenge inspection. We hope that our findings will be of help in the further consideration of the issue of challenge inspections. We are continuing our series of trial challenge inspections. And we will continue to report on the practical experience we gain through them to the Conference on Disarmament.

With a view to promoting progress in our chemical weapons negotiations my Government intends to hold a workshop devoted to verification issues on 14 and 15 June this year in Munster, located between Hamburg and Hanover in Lower Saxony. The workshop is to focus on technical aspects of verification, in particular the use of instruments and equipment. The inspection equipment which was successfully employed in our trial challenge inspection, and on which details are contained in the report I have submitted today, will be demonstrated. In addition, the workshop will provide an opportunity to get acquainted with procedures for the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons employed at the Federal Armed Forces' destruction plant in Munster for eliminating old stocks of chemical weapons that were found after the first and second world wars.

On behalf of my Government, I have pleasure in inviting all heads of delegation of CD members as well as interested observer States to attend this workshop. In addition to the heads of delegation one further member from each delegation is invited to attend. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will provide transport by special aircraft. It will also provide hotel accommodation and meals. It is planned that the aeroplane provided by the Federal Government will depart from Geneva on the morning of 14 June. The arrival of the return flight in Geneva is scheduled for approximately 5.30 p.m. on 15 June 1990. A written invitation with further details on the programme of the workshop will be provided as soon as possible. To be able to make the necessary arrangements for the workshop we would appreciate it if each delegation could inform us by 23 April 1990 whether it will participate in the workshop and, if so, who will be attending.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the generous announcement regarding the workshop in Munster, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? Since that does not seem to be the case I should like to recall that, at the plenary meeting of the Conference to be held on Thursday 12 April, we shall take up the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in document CD/981.

(The President)

The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, informs me that he is to hold open-ended consultations with the group co-ordinators and the representatives of any other interested delegations following the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee this afternoon. Those consultations will take place in room C.108, next to the Council Chamber.

As announced earlier, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, five minutes after the conclusion of this plenary meeting.

As there seems to be no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.